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Founded in December 2011 by a group of young academics 
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of China-DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea/㫆㍶⹒
㭒㭒㦮㧎⹒Ὃ䢪ῃ/North Korea/Ӕ༷/⿗䞲) documentation and 
analysis covering the culture, economies and foreign relations of 
these complex states. 
Work published on Sino-NK has been cited in such standard 
journalistic outlets as The Economist, New York Times, Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, and Wall Street Journal, and our analysts 
have been featured in a range of other publications. Ultimately, Si-
no-NK seeks to function as a bridge between the ubiquitous North 
Korea media discourse and a more specialized world, that of the 
academic think tank debates that swirl around the DPRK and its 
immense neighbor.
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Preface
Old Stories Told Anew
by James Hoare
One of the curiosities of retirement is noting just how many of the issues I once dealt with as a member of the 
)RUHLJQDQG&RPPRQZHDOWK2I¿FH¶V)&25HVHDUFK$QDO\VWVIURPWRDUHVWLOODURXQG2QHRIWKH
¿UVWSDSHUV,ZURWHRQMRLQLQJWKH)&2ZDVRQWKH'DL\XWDL6HQNDNXLVVXH7KHVWDWXVRI7DLZDQZDVDQRWKHUHDUO\
topic. The South China Sea was a perennial favorite, as was the issue of Japanese apologies for the war. A paper I 
wrote on Dokdo/Takeshima O☛☚VỒặ) has, I understand, recently been re-circulated, complete with quote from 
“Hamlet.” Most issues relating to the Korean Peninsula have not gone away. So in one way, it is no surprise that 
the concept of the Tumen River O䒂ⰢṫV๭ૌࡾ) as a development area has resurfaced.
Back in the early 1990s, when I was working in the British Embassy in Beijing, what was then called the Tu-
men River Development Project was just getting underway. It was a grandiose concept, under the auspices of the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea (ROK) – then reaching out to the communist world 
as never before – Russia, Mongolia and Japan.1  There were great expectations of a region that was thought to be 
rich in natural resources, including oil and gas, minerals and timber. In theory, the project would affect over 300 
PLOOLRQSHRSOH,WZRXOGSURYLGHODQGORFNHG0RQJROLDZLWKDQRXWOHWWRWKHVHDDQGEHQH¿WUHPRWHDUHDVRIWKH
PRC and Russia. It would bring the two Koreas together and in particular, provide a much-needed stimulus for 
WKHVDJJLQJ'35.HFRQRP\-DSDQZDVWREHWKH¿QDQFLDOSRZHUKRXVHEHKLQGDOOWKLV,WZDVDIWHUDOOWKH-DSD-
QHVHZKRKDGEHJXQWKH¿UVWPRGHUQGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHDUHDFUHDWLQJWKHSRUWRI5DMLQ⧒㰚㔲Vઅࣃ൧) in the 
FRORQLDOSHULRGEHWWHUWROLQN.RUHDDQG-DSDQ$VWKH&ROG:DUVHHPHGWREH¿QDOO\HQGLQJWKHHFRQRPLFDQG
SROLWLFDOEHQH¿WVRIWKHSURMHFWVHHPHGHQRUPRXV
 When I visited the PRC’s Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture O㡢⼲㫆㍶㫇㧦䂮㭒/࿼шӔ༷ቂሱᇍ
1 Hsi-I Angel Chen, Transnational Sub-regional Cooperation in Practice: Dynamics of Micro-regionalism and Micro-regionalisation 
LQWKH(DVW$VLD3DFL¿F, PhD thesis, University of York, 2009.
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ᇜᠭԽ൧) in May 1991, however, it was obvious that the concept had a long way to go. Yanbian would be an 
important part of the project but at that stage it was pretty undeveloped.2  Away from the cities, the infrastructure 
was poor or non-existent. Although the PRC had already begun to develop Hunchun O䤞㿮㔲VᠭԽ൧) as a center 
for the Tumen Project, we were not allowed to visit. This was unusual for by then the rules that had once restricted 
diplomatic movement over much of Chinese territory had begun to disappear and it was rare to be prevented from 
visiting cities except in Tibet and Xinjiang. But clearly at that time, Hunchun, and the Tumen Project were sensi-
tive issues.
I must confess that the May 1991 visit was the only one that I have made to the Tumen River project, but I have 
IROORZHGLWVIRUWXQHVZLWKLQWHUHVWHYHUVLQFH7KLVZDVKHOSHGE\DÀXUU\RIDFDGHPLFDQGMRXUQDOLVWLFDFWLYLW\
during subsequent years.3  Friends and acquaintances visited and reported back on developments on the ground. 
Japanese interest soon waned but the other countries continued with the project. The PRC, Russia, and the DPRK 
began constructing special economic zones in the region. Hunchun became more open and was soon a major city. 
7KH'35.GHYHORSHGLWV¿UVW6SHFLDO(FRQRPLF=RQHEDVHGRQWKHWZLQSRUWVRI5DMLQDQG6HRQERQJ7KH]RQH
was treated as something of a joke in the Western media, which tended to ignore the bigger picture and concen-
trate on the fact that Rajin-Seonbong (⧒㰚㍶⽟Vઅࣃ༵ỿ) was about as far as you could get from the DPRK’s 
FDSLWDO3\RQJ\DQJZLWKRXWIDOOLQJLQWRWKH3DFL¿F2FHDQ4  The image of the zone was not helped when its main 
investment seemed to be casinos.
Indeed, the distance of the Tumen River area from everywhere developed soon began to tell, as did the ab-
sence of Japanese money that had always been seen as a necessary driving power behind the concept. Infrastruc-
ture development was slow and the DPRK’s increasing economic problems from the mid-1990s hindered the 
project further. Although a series of agreements were signed in 1995 between the main participants, there was 
little progress. The deterioration of relations between the two Koreas that followed the death of President Kim 
Il-sung of the DPRK in 1994 did not help and neither did the continued economic decline of the DPRK. In 2005, 
the countries involved met at Changchun in the PRC. There they formally took over the project from UNDP, 
although that organization continued to play a supporting role. The project’s name was changed from the Tumen 
River Development Project to the Greater Tumen Initiative. The meeting also adopted an action plan, which en-
visaged the infrastructure development for the region, as well as the build-up of tourism and general investment. 
Environmental protection was to be another overarching concern.
Despite the high hopes of 2005, subsequent years have seen little advance on the overall plan. A secretariat 
2 See also Paul White, “Letter from Yanji,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 29, 1984.
3 James Hoare, Embassies in the East: The Story of the British and their Embassies in China, Japan and Korea from 1859 to the 
Present (London: Curzon, 1999); James Hoare and Richard Rutt, Korea: a Historical and Cultural Dictionary (London: Routledge 
1999); James Hoare, Japan’s Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements: The Uninvited Guests 1858-1899 (London: Curzon, 1994).
 )RUGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHQDVFHQW6(=VLQWKHVDQGHDUO\VVHH$QGUHL/DQNRYNorth of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in 
North Korea (Jefferson, N.C. and London: McFarland & Co., 2007).    
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remains in existence but meetings are somewhat spasmodic.5  The DPRK has become less interested and often 
does not attend meetings, or attends only portions of meetings.6  Relations between the two Koreas have steadily 
deteriorated since 2008, which has reduced the likelihood of cooperation. Yet in many ways, the original concept 
is beginning to work. There have been major developments in Chinese and Russian territories, and these have 
increasingly involved the DPRK. Rajin-Seonbong, now renamed Rason (⧒㍶㔲/અ༵൧), has received much 
Chinese investment and is developing into something more than a center for casinos and empty hotels.7
The Tumen Triangle Documentation Project comes at an opportune moment, therefore. It brings together 
young scholars from a wide range of disciplines and with interests well beyond the economic development of 
the region. Borderlands are complex areas with both pull and push factors operating. The Greater Tumen area is 
a major center for North Korean refugees for example, and as a consequence is an area in which agencies and 
organizations many countries are involved. It is one of the traditional invasion routes between China and Korea. 
,WVUHPRWHQHVVDQGUHODWLYHHPSWLQHVVKDYHORQJPDGHLWDFHQWHURIH[LOHDWUDGLWLRQUHÀHFWHGLQWKH1RUWK.RUHDQ
detention camps that are known to exist in the areas. These issues and many others are well worth examining and 
will feature in the new project.
 
J. E. Hoare
British Charge d’Affaires to the DPRK, 2001-2002
5 See http://www.tumenprogramme.org/ for further information.
6 “DPRK Energy and Minerals Experts Working Group Meeting Held in Beijing,” Nautilus Institute, December 2010.
7 “China, Russia developing infrastructure in N. Korean port city,” Asahi Shimbun, September 7, 2011.
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Introduction
The Tumen Triangle as Region and as Project
by Adam Cathcart and Christopher Green
What is the purpose of examining “the Tumen Triangle,” the multinational landmass centered upon the DPRK’s 
Tumen River frontier with China?
Foremost among the reasons for such an endeavor is the need to escape, analytically speaking, from Pyong-
yang’s gravitational pull. To be sure, the period since the death of Kim Jong-il has seen intense changes in the 
North Korean capital: steadier electricity, relatively rapid turnover in certain leadership positions in the Korean 
Workers’ Party, the renovation and creation of parks on a large scale, permission for foreigners to carry in cell 
phones, and of course, the vigorous presence of Kim Jong-un at various intersections of the new cycles of his-
tory in this fairyland-fortress.  But while he may be omnipresent in Pyongyang with what the North Korean state 
media calls his “matchless pluck,” Kim has scarcely ventured into the grit outside of the city.1 An examination of 
his activities beyond the capital would yield virtually no information about the DPRK’s northern periphery.  Kim 
Jong-un, as a leader rather than a studious successor, does not travel to Hoeryeong O䣢⪏㔲V߶ୡ൧); his char-
ismatic and jowly smile does not shine in person upon the citizens of Hyesan O䡲㌆㔲V߲೶൧). Still less does 
Kim frequent or so much as set foot upon the zones of ostensible economic “reform and opening up” OṲ䡗Ṳ⹿V
ڿ۪ष٢), e.g. Rason and Hwanggeumpyeong O䢿⁞䘟Vߛࣁ௙). Despite the dominant orientation of analysis 
toward the North Korean capital, we have moved away to study the northeast of the DPRK, and its multivalent 
Chinese connecting points, offsetting abundant light shone upon Pyongyang, the body of the North Korean lead-
ership itself, and counterbalancing the Pyongyang-centered narrative.
Fine, says the skeptic, Pyongyang is overexposed, but why not shine the analytical light on other alternate 
1 Amid the tidal wave of foreign reportage covering Kim Jong-un’s “on-site inspection” of offshore island units in spring 2013 was 
the fact that at least the war, or the appearance of one, had resulted in moving Kim Jong-un’s substantial physical frame out of the 
capital. For well-documented discussion of the Pyongyangist tendencies of the leader, see Stephan Haggard and Luke Herman, 
“Information—and Disinformation—on the North Korean Political Scene,” Witness to Transformation blog, Peterson Institite for 
International Economics, December 18th, 2012.
Sino-NK
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areas of North Korean life and policy implementation or neglect? After all, Hwanghae Province [䢿䟊☚Vߛݚ֡] 
VDZDZIXOVXPPHUÀRRGLQJLQDQGWKHUHWXUQRISRFNHWVRIIDPLQHWKDWVXUHO\UHTXLUHDWWHQWLRQ2 Moreover, 
along the frontier with China, the Sinuiju-Dandong interchange—not to mention life in Sinuiju [㔶㥚㭒㔲Vྍၬ
ᇜ] itself—surely merits more study.3  Perhaps quixotically so, the Tumen Triangle is in many ways a forward-
looking geographical area, a place that needs to be watched now, when change is a mere twenty years old. The 
region lies not simply at the juncture of nations and systems, but it is at the forefront of many profound political 
and social “improvements” (Ṳ㍶/gaeseonDXQLTXHDQGFRQÀLFWHGFRQFHSWLQ.RUHDQSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\DVSDUW
of political narratives that are being promoted, and resisted, in the region. 
Although, as Dr. Hoare correctly notes, the Tumen Triangle is not something new that we happen to have just 
IRXQG$IWHUDOOWKH5DMLQ6HRQERQJ5DVRQ6SHFLDO(FRQRPLF=RQHLVQRZDOPRVWWZHQW\\HDUVROG7KDWEHLQJ
the case, what is there left to say?
A great deal. First, and perhaps most importantly, the Chinese government appears now to have concluded that 
it has a long-term strategic interest in developing the Tumen Triangle region, and that is something which cannot 
2 Chris Green, Interview with Martha Keamey, The World at One, BBC, April 12, 2013.
3 Adam Cathcart, Roger Cavazos and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “'U6WUDQJHORYHDQGWKH6SHFLDO(FRQRPLF=RQH%DODQFH
and Imbalance in China’s Long-Term North Korea Strategy,” KEI Peninsula [Korea Economic Institute website], January 7, 2013.
The Tumen Triangle | Source: Curtis Melvin and Gregory Pence
The Tumen Triangle Project
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happen without North Korean acquiescence. Finally arising out of the reorganization of state-owned industry that 
VRWUDXPDWL]HGWKHUHJLRQLQWKHVWKH7KUHH1RUWKHDVWHUQ3URYLQFHV=KRQJJXRGRQJVDQVKHQJᇏݓת೘
സ, or just Dongbei/תК) of China still lag behind the broader development of China’s eastern seaboard. Largely 
landlocked by Russia and North Korea, it is no simple task for provincial and municipal governments in these 
areas to go beyond the mere provision of primary resources to larger and more technologically advanced regions 
VRXWKRI%HLMLQJ%\IRUJLQJSUDFWLFDOHI¿FLHQWDQGUHOLDEOHDFFHVVURXWHVWRWKHVHDSURYLQFLDODQGFHQWUDODX-
thorities in China hope to implement broader, more expansionist development plans and lock in the loyalty of the 
Han majority and the other ethnic groups—including, but not limited to, the Korean minority—that live there.
For the relatively impoverished North Korean government, China’s northeasterly drive ought to represent 
a golden opportunity. However, the response to date has been a complex mix of enthusiasm, investment and 
retrenchment, fear, and paranoia, abject confusion and even a certain strategic ambivalence. Perhaps it comes 
down to the idea explicated in North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics, a new and essential text co-authored by 
Cambridge scholar Professor Heonik Kwon and Hanyang University anthropologist Professor Chung Byung-ho: 
Pyongyang is relatively disinterested in economic matters when compared with security and propaganda ones, 
but does simultaneously recognize the fact that “at any point in the hierarchy, but most intensely and unevadably 
near the top, where the “far-beaming blaze of majesty” consumes so much more fuel, the necessity to demonstrate 
status wars with the necessity to assemble the support to make the demonstration possible.”4 
In other words, running the North Korean theatre state is expensive. Needless to say, the Tumen Triangle is 
one of the most vital locations in which this fact is, at least in theory, being addressed. That is one reason why it 
is so important.
For scholars, the case study of a borderland in transition may also be of use.5 Chinese-North Korean relations 
along this frontier are fraught, and the interactions between the populations within and on both sides of the border 
DUHVLJQL¿FDQWEDURPHWHUVIRUDQ\QXPEHURILPSRUWDQWTXHVWLRQV$UHPDUNHWVDQGVSHFLDOHFRQRPLF]RQHVQHDU
the Chinese border true levers for cultural change in the DPRK? To what extent is the border permeable when it 
FRPHVWRLGHDVRU¿QDQFLDOÀRZVRUHQYLURQPHQWDOPDQDJHPHQW"7KH&KLQHVH1RUWK.RUHDQERXQGDU\²LQRXU
case, marked the by Tumen River from its Paektusan/Changbaishan origins until it loses itself into the void of the 
Sea of Japan—is one of continual exchange, activity, and controversy. 
Not least among those controversies is how stories are told, and what stories are told, in the region. Our look 
DWVRXUFHVIURPWKHERUGHUODQGVHQFRPSDVVHVQRWVLPSO\WKHVLJQL¿FDQWQDUUDWLYHVVWDQGSRLQWRIUHIXJHHVÀHHLQJ
North Korea or sources from within, but also the narratives the North Korean state itself choses to put forth about 
4 Heon-ik Kwon and Byung-ho Chung, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics/DQKDP5RZPDQ	/LWWOH¿HOG3XEOLVKHUV
2012). See also Clifford C. Geertz, The Theatre State in 19th Century Bali (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
5 Valérie Gelézeau, “The inter-Korean Border Region – ‘Meta-border’ of the Cold War and Metamorphic Frontier of the Penin-
sula,” in Doris Wastl-Walter, ed., The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies (Ashgate, 2011), 325-350. See also Valérie 
Gelézeau, Koen de Ceuster, and Alain Delissen, De-Bordering Korea: Tangible and Intangible Legacies of the Sunshine Policy 
(London: Routledge, 2013); Lee Si-Woo, Life on the Edge of the DMZ, translated by Myung-Hee Kim (Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 
2008).
Sino-NK
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the region. This activity of ours functions as an effort to bring together and evaluate what we know and how we 
know it.   
Each issue of the Tumen Triangle Documentation Project will focus on current events in the region, but will 
DOVRORRNEDFNDQGUHFRQVWUXFWVRXUFHVIURPWKHODVWIHZ\HDUVVRDVWRIDFLOLWDWHTXDQWL¿FDWLRQRIZKDWUHDOO\LV
“new” and what, as Dr. Hoare so adroitly notes in his preface to this edition, has been going on so long it barely 
warrants discussion. In addition, we will look more closely at a different region of the Tumen Triangle in every 
issue, hoping to catch a glimpse of something fresh, something different. First up is Hoeryeong, a city of such 
contradictions that it could not possibly have avoided our gaze.
The Tumen Triangle Documentation Project is not the kind of undertaking that the Sino-NK team could pos-
sibly do alone. Fortunately, then, there are a number of exceptionally talented people working on North Korea 
and the borderlands today, and some of them have agreed to lend a hand. We have been fortunate to receive a 
special essay from Jang Jin-sung. Mr. Jang is not simply a North Korean refugee from the upper echelons of the 
Kim regime: He has made the decision to step into the light, launching the vibrant Korean-language website New 
Focus (and its English-language offshoot, New Focus International) to better inform the world about what North 
Korea is, and what it means. 
(OVHZKHUHZH¶YHDOVRJRWD¿QHSLHFHRIUHSRUWDJHIURP$QGUD\$EUDKDPLDQRQHRIWKHGLUHFWRUVRI&KRVRQ
Exchange, a non-governmental organization (NGO) that is doing groundbreaking work on training North Korean 
bureaucrats inside North Korea.6 We’ve also got a great piece by the executive director of the Committee for Hu-
man Rights in North Korea (HRNK), Greg Scarlatoiu, who discusses the future of something we should all be 
talking about much, much more: North Korea’s system of political prison camps. Finally, of course, we’ve got 
great essays from regular Sino-NK analysts Robert Winstanley-Chesters, Brian Gleason, Benjamin Young, and 
Mycal Ford. 
Sino-N.0DQDJLQJ(GLWRU6WHYHQ'HQQH\DQG$VVLVWDQW(GLWRU'DUFLH'UDXGWZLWKRXWZKRPWKLV¿UVWHGLWLRQ
would not have been possible, deserve thanks, as do Curtis Melvin of North Korea Economy Watch7  and Gregory 
Pence of Toon Out The World,8  who combined to establish the pictorial boundaries of the Tumen Triangle itself. 
Finally, throughout the writing, editing and conceptual process, Ambassador James Hoare has been highly sup-
portive of the endeavor and generous with his critiques and analytical insights. 
6 http://chosonexchange.org/
7 http://www.nkeconwatch.com/
8 http://www.toonouttheworld.com/
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Featured Essay One
Bring the Mountain to Mohammed:  
Markets in Namyang
by Christopher Green1 
Recent news2 that a “border market” in rural, mountainous Namyang (⋾㟧/ଲဝ), North Hamgyeong Prov-
ince [䞾ἓ⿗☚/༹ࣤК֡] has been opened on a limited basis to Chinese businesspeople is one of the most 
LQWULJXLQJVWRULHVWRHPHUJHIURP1RUWK.RUHDLQUHFHQWWLPHV$WWKHYHU\OHDVWLWRIIHUV¿UVWUDWHFLUFXPVWDQWLDO
evidence to suggest that the Kim Jong-un regime has concluded that it will have to move away from the course 
FKDUWHGGXULQJWKH¿QDO\HDUVRILWVSUHGHFHVVRU
According to sources in the region, since the beginning of June, between 50 and 70 Chinese businesspeople 
per day have been permitted to trade directly with North Koreans via the border market. The incoming Chinese 
are allowed to remain in North Korea for the eight hours from 9AM to 5PM, but not to reside in the country. They 
take up approximately 1/3 of the stall space, which has been expanded to accommodate them. While they are not 
permitted to leave the marketplace and its immediate surrounds, which is only around 200m from the customs 
KRXVHDW1DP\DQJLWGRHVPHDQWKDWIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHLQUHFHQWKLVWRU\&KLQHVHFDSLWDOLVWVDUHEHLQJDOORZHGWR
come into contact with the socialist North Korean masses, including some who have presumably not been vetted 
in advance to ensure their regime loyalty.
It appears that China is providing local oversight on the project via its consul-general in the industrial city of 
Cheongjin. If his June 14 visit to Changbai County (㺓⹪㧊ῆ/ӉϢཅ) were any guide, it would appear that 
the same gentleman is dealing with this project in Hyesan.3 This offers proof that the majority of the burgeoning 
weight of economic cooperation in the North Korean northeast comes with the full backing of China’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.
For the record, it is said that the North Korean authorities initially agreed to “open” Namyang before Kim 
1 Essay originally published by www.SinoNK.com on June 24th, 2012 here.
2 Choi Song Min, “50-70 Traders Arriving in Namyang Daily,” Daily NK, July 20, 2012.
3 Kim Kwang Jin, “2,500 Jobs Heading for Hyesan,” Daily NK, June 23, 2012.
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Jong-il died. The deal is purported to be a quid pro quo for much-needed infrastructure developments the Chinese 
authorities are undertaking in the area, notably at Rason but also road and rail construction work between Tumen, 
Namyang and Cheongjin (㼃㰚㔲/ ౢࣃ).
,QDQ\FDVHWKH¿UVWDQGPRVWREYLRXVTXHVWLRQWRDVNDERXWWKHERUGHUPDUNHWSURMHFWLV³:K\1DP\DQJ"´
GEOGRAPHICAL CONTROL: TUCKING TRADE AWAY IN THE MOUNTAINS | Predominantly, it seems to 
be a question of geography. Look at a political map of North Korea, and it will show that Namyang is the most 
northerly point in the country and an extremely long way from Pyongyang. But it will not show that the town is 
ÀDQNHGWRWKHVRXWKE\PRXQWDLQV7KLVPHDQVWKDWLWLVKDUGWRDFFHVVIURPWKH1RUWK.RUHDQVLGHWRWUDYHOE\
WUDLQIURP&KHRQJMLQIRUH[DPSOHRQHKDVWRSDVVWKURXJKWKH5DVRQ6(=WRWKHQRUWKHDVWEHIRUHVNLUWLQJWKH
border with China and Russia for some considerable time.
Conversely, from the Chinese side, Namyang is comparatively easy to reach, or at least easier than the Rason 
Abandon all hope those who would enter here: North Hamgyeong | Source: BASPIA
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6(=7KLVLVHVSHFLDOO\WUXHIURP<DQMLWKHQHDUHVWVLJQL¿FDQWFLW\ZKLFKLVPRUHWKDQWZRKRXUVIURP+XQFKXQ
the de facto gateway to Rason. In part this could be an attempt on the part of the Chinese authorities to level the 
GRPHVWLFGHYHORSPHQWDOSOD\LQJ¿HOGVLQFH7XPHQLVQRWFXUUHQWO\JURZLQJDVIDVWDV+XQFKXQGHVSLWHLWVJHR-
graphical advantages.
For Pyongyang, the border market project looks like an experiment in “bringing the mountain to Mohammed.” 
In other words, rather than allowing employees from various North Korean foreign currency-earning enterprises 
to go out into China and elsewhere to engage in foreign-currency earning activities, why not get the Chinese to 
come in and do their buying and selling in situ? After all, just because this is a market doesn’t mean that the Chi-
nese businesspeople entering are “just” traders, and there is no reason to believe that the only customers will be 
North Koreans hoping to buy cheap rice for the family.
As such, the market could theoretically become a locus for all kinds of commercial activities, large and small. 
In addition to which, import-export taxes can be levied on stock inventories and income as the Chinese come and 
go, earning hard currency for the North that it might not otherwise be in a position to collect.
BACK TO THE FUTURE: OLD IDEAS, NEW LOCATIONS | While the appearance of Chinese in the Namyang 
market may appear novel, in fact, it’s not even a new idea. In 2005, when ideas of economic reform were at or 
around their peak in Pyongyang, North Korea prepared to launch an almost identical “border market” in Hoeryeo-
ng.4 The authorities even went to the lengths of upgrading an existing market (see picture) to accommodate the 
SODQQHGLQÀX[RI&KLQHVHEXVLQHVVSHRSOH+RZHYHUWKHSODQZDVHYHQWXDOO\VKHOYHGDOOHJHGO\DIWHU.LP-RQJLO
ordered a drastic retrenchment from what he saw as burgeoning “anti-socialist phenomena” that he could envision 
4 “Hoeryeongsekwan ape choicho kukkyongshichang shinchukchung´>&RQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH¿UVW³ERUGHUODQGPDUNHW´FXVWRPVKRXVH
in Hoeryeong underway], Daily NK, September 14, 2012.
Hoeryeong Market and Customs House in 2005 | Source: Daily NK
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himself struggling to control.
Evidently, either Kim Jong-un is less concerned by this, or feels himself to be in greater need of foreign cur-
rency than his father was. Either way, the Namyang border market clearly represents a modest experiment in 
reform in the 2005 mold, as if Pyongyang had been doing a little housekeeping and in the process stumbled upon 
a few 2005-era economic planning documents behind the fridge.
Alas, the outside world has not been and will not be privy to the debate that this perspicacious discovery may 
KDYHHQJHQGHUHG+RZHYHUHYHQIURPWKHRXWVLGHLWLVFOHDUWKDWWKH1DP\DQJH[SHULPHQW¿WVLQZLWKDZLGHUVHW
of pointers implying a modest (and, note, entirely reversible) economic reform agenda.
First, it is worth noting the ongoing Rodong Sinmun prominence since January of Prime Minister Choe Yeong-
rim (who, as head of the Cabinet, is technically responsible for North Korea’s civilian economy). It is true that 
Choe was commonly used by the regime of Kim Jong-il to distance the supreme leader from blame for the mori-
bund state of the North Korean economy, but the frequency of his appearances has increased markedly in this 
calendar year, and the importance of his branch of government, the Cabinet, seems to have grown with it.
&KRHLVPRUHWKDQMXVWD¿JXUHKHDG1RWDEO\KHYLVLWHG&KLQDIRU¿YHGD\VLQODWH6HSWHPEHUDWZKLFK
time he and Wen Jiabao made a number of business-friendly noises. In the words of Scott Snyder of CFR and 
Byun See-won, Choe “pledged to improve the investment environment for Chinese businesses in an apparent 
indication of Pyongyang’s efforts to draw foreign investment.”5  And in the words of the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, “Choe said that the DPRK is willing to work with China to actively implement the important 
consensus reached by leaders of both countries, further expand bilateral exchanges and cooperation in various 
¿HOGVDQGPDNHSRVLWLYHHIIRUWVLQSURPRWLQJVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWLQWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHFRXQWULHVDQG
maintaining regional peace and stability.” 6
This Sino-North Korean bilateral positivity was then followed up when, on October 23, 2011, First Vice Pre-
mier Li Keqiang headed to Pyongyang, where he again met Choe. With little preamble, the two sides subsequently 
signed a number of agreements covering, as one should expect, economic plans.
Second, it is impossible to ignore the ideological element. As Bob Carlin has pointed out, although Kim Jong-
XQLVEHLQJSRVLWLRQHGLQWKHSURSDJDQGDQDUUDWLYHDVWKHVXFFHVVRUWRWKHPLOLWDU\¿UVWSROLWLFDOOLQHKHLVDOVR
being positioned as a leader who is going to bring a better life to the people (after all, they must “never have to 
tighten their belts again”).7 
Stephan Haggard is right on this point; even by the quixotic standards of the North Korean government, this 
would be an odd communications strategy to employ if one were not intending to at least try some experiments in 
the direction of economic improvement.8  This fact alone also implies (though does not by any means guarantee) 
5 http://SinoNK¿OHVZRUGSUHVVFRPVQ\GHUDQGE\XQFKLQDNRUHDFRPSDUDWLYHFRQQHFWLRQVQRSGI
6 “Jia Qinglin Meets with DPRK Premier Choe Yong Rim,” PRC Foreign Ministry, September 28, 2011.   
7 James Church, “Keep Your Eye on the Duck,” 38 North, June 19, 2012.
8 Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard, “The Food Situation in North Korea: Contested facts and possibly incoherent behavior,” 
Witness to Transformation blog, Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 22, 2012.
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that there is an economically reformist element (an element which includes the ubiquitous Jang Sung-taek and 
light industry department head Kim Kyung-hee, no doubt) that is, if not exactly in the ascendency, then at least 
being included in the discussion down by the Daedong River.
In many senses, Pyongyang is in a “damned if you do, and damned if you don’t” scenario. If it opens its 
HFRQRP\LWULVNVWKHLQÀX[RILQIRUPDWLRQRQOLIHLQ6RXWK.RUHDZKLFKVRPHH[SHUWVWKRXJKQRWWKLVRQHDVVHUW
will lead to the regime’s demise as surely as the sun comes up in the morning, and if it doesn’t open its economy 
at all then it is sure to reach a tipping point from which the state cannot continue to function even to the extent of 
placating the all-important 2-3 million residents of the Pyongyang metropolitan area and the Party’s provincial 
¿HIV7KH\NQRZDVZHOODVZHGRWKDWDFRPSURPLVHQHHGVWREHIRXQGDQGRQHWKDWGRHV³DVOLWWOHGDPQLQJDV
possible.” One way or another, North Korea is going to have to open up a little, as it seems to have already done 
at Namyang.
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Featured Essay Two
South of the Tumen and North of the Sea
by Robert Winstanley-Chesters
³:HTXLHWO\FURVVHGWKH5LYHU7XPDQ>VLF@E\ERDWDWQLJKW«$V,ORRNHGDWWKHPRXQWDLQVDQG¿HOGVYHLOHG
in darkness I could not repressing my beating heart at my deep emotions at returning to my homeland after 
¿YH\HDUV«,WROG2K-XQJKZDKRZJRRGLWZRXOGEHLIZHZHUHFURVVLQJWKHULYHUDIWHUZLQQLQJWKHLQGH-
pendence of the country…Oh Jung-hwa said that he felt the same each time he crossed the River Tuman 
[sic].” (Kim Il-sung, 1992)
North Korea has rarely lacked in symbolic rivers and “foundational events” in which practical policy was con-
nected to ideological theorization and bestowed with dynastic authority. “The Botong River Improvement Pro-
MHFW´RIGLUHFWO\IRFXVHVRQWKHUHHQJLQHHULQJRULPSURYHPHQWRIULYHUVWKHLUVWUHDPÀRZDQGDFFRUGLQJO\
WKHLUWHQGHQF\WRÀRRGLQDGHVWUXFWLYHIDVKLRQ,WLVDOVRRQHRIWKHYHU\¿UVWLQVWDQFHVRIDVHFWRUDOIRXQGDWLRQDO
event in the history of the DPRK, very close to the moment of national foundation and liberation itself. Might this 
tell us something about the importance of rivers and streams within a wider thematic approach to other narratives 
on a national scale?
Along with their current participation within and utilization by the DPRK’s institutions and bureaucracies, 
presentational and dynastic narratives, and diplomatic initiatives, environmental features have long played a role 
within the historical narratology of the DPRK. This is especially true of watercourses and rivers including the 
Tumen River itself. In a previous piece for Sino-NK, I analyzed the role of forests and afforested spaces of the 
DPRK within its narratives of legitimacy and authority.1 Political actors who would later form the governmental 
and leadership clique of the DPRK operated in such a narrative hinterland. Their struggles for revolutionary le-
gitimacy and authority (from the DPRK’s perspective) undertook their actions within the forests and wildernesses 
of northern Manchuria. Within this narrative of revolutionary action and incarnation, these forests and wilder-
nesses themselves, as well as being simple backdrop, have become incorporated within the narrative as actors and 
1 Robert Winstanley-Chesters, “Forests as Spaces of Revolution and Resistance : Thoughts on Arboreal Comradeship on a Divided 
Peninsula,” Sino-NK, June 28, 2012.
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Kim Il-sung in stylized form | Source: Preface to Kim Il-sung: Legendary Hero for All Ages2 
 
participants themselves, as well as becoming representative of the nation of Korea itself (even if many of these 
forests are not necessarily within the bounds of the Korean nation as conventionally understood).
The Korean Peninsula and both Korean nations (as they now stand), topographically and geographically are 
in reality something of an oddity, in that the Peninsula itself would be an island where it not for the protrusion of 
the Mt Baekdu (⺇⚦㌆VӉϢ೶) massif. Flowing to the east and to the west from the slopes of Baekdu, the rivers 
Yalu and Tumen form, from—from the cartographer’s perspective—the perfect geographical national bound-
ary. The forests in which revolutionary struggle and action was undertaken by the “founders” and articulators of 
the DPRK and its national mythos cannot but help abut this watery dividing line. Would it be at all surprising, 
therefore, if these rivers were subject to inclusion within these narratives? Just as the surely for any revolutionary 
movement forced into diasporic exile by colonial forces, the ultimate action of success and fruition would be a 
return to the geographic space of the homeland, in the DPRK’s case an action necessitating a crossing of either of 
these rivers. For Kim Il-sung, whose memory is represented by the “autobiographical” text of “With the Century,” 
2 Hose F. A. Bulgarelli, Kim Il-sung: Legendary Hero for All Ages (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978).
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from which the quotation that begins this piece is derived, crossing the Tumen was something of an existential 
moment. Crossing the watery boundary from the hostile liminal space of Manchuria or Primorksy Krai in the 
Soviet Far East onto the Korean side of nationalist potentiality is presented as one of a set of moments of almost 
SURSKHWLFIXO¿OOPHQW
Both the Yalu and Tumen rivers following the collapse of Japanese colonial power in 1945 and the post-war 
VROLGL¿FDWLRQRISRZHUDURXQGWKHSHUVRQRI.LP,OVXQJLQWKHQRUWKDORQJZLWK%DHNGXLWVHOIVHUYHDVDJHR-
graphic/topographic pyramid of narrative and legitimatory authority, with DPRK sources often making sure to 
mention all three in narratological tandem.3+RZHYHULWLVGLI¿FXOWWRDVVHUWLQQDUUDWLYHWHUPVWKHVXSHULRULW\RI
Tumen over the Yalu. Just as owing to a topographical accident related to usefulness and accessibility, the DPRK 
has primarily looked to its western seas, coasts and boundaries, so the Yalu has always appeared the senior of the 
two border watercourses. The Yalu crossing at Dandong/Sinuiju after all has supported the great bulk of cross 
border trade and for foreign visitors entering by railway the “Friendship” bridge over the Yalu is a familiar land-
PDUNRQD3\RQJ\DQJERXQGWUDLQ+RZHYHUWKHVLWXDWLRQDSSHDUVDWORQJODVWWREHDSURFHVVRIÀX[ZLWKUHJDUGV
3 “Meeting held for development of Tuman River area,” KCNA, November 19, 1997.
Bridge over the Tumen River | Source: © Albert Hulsen
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to matters of narratological and legitimatory import in relation to these two rivers.
Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the “Arduous March,” the DPRK has been forced to pitch 
about for willing and accessible partners, as well as begin the process of learning how to communicate with these 
partners and develop the institutional/bureaucratic linguistics through which to exist in a post-1992 world. In my 
doctoral dissertation and in my previous postings for Sino-NK, I have covered the almost gymnastic adaptations 
of institutional approach the DPRK has been encouraged to adopt in light of western/world adoption of models of 
conservation and environmental mitigation, so far as the natural world is concerned. I have recounted the adoption 
of new strategies surrounding the planting of trees, the incorporation of new celebratory and commemorative days 
UHODWHGWRVZDPSVÀRUDDQGIDXQDDQGWKHJHQHUDOHQYLURQPHQWZLWKLQWKH'35.,KDYHDOVRQRWHGWKHGHYHORS-
ment of a theme of legitimatory narrative material in which the authority and validity and veracity of the DPRK 
and its institutions is directly connected to their environmental credentials and potential eco-friendliness. In the 
years following the Arduous March these environmental narratives have been utilized to develop new levels of 
legitimative authority for the DPRK’s institutions and government, and previous elements of historical narrative 
incorporated within a new thematic. The founding in 1995 of the Tumen River Area Development Programme 
(TRADP), under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme and the DPRK’s membership of 
that program suggested that the Tumen River would not be excluded from this narrative process.
Although TRADP appears primarily to have focused on economic and developmental matters (“regional de-
velopment, economic cooperation and environmental management”), part of the rational for its creation was the 
QHHGWRPLWLJDWHH[WUHPHOHYHOVRISROOXWLRQJHQHUDWHGIURPHIÀXHQWHPLWWHGE\&KLQHVHDQG'35.SXOSPLOOV
and iron mining.4 This body apparently met for some ten years, and its meetings and work are noted within the 
'35.¶VQDUUDWLYHDQGPHGLDUHFRUGVRIWKHWLPHKRZHYHUGLI¿FXOWLHVLQGHYHORSLQJDZRUNLQJUHODWLRQVKLSEH-
tween the two Koreas (Participants in the Programme included China, Russia, South and North Korea and Mon-
golia), meant that in 2005 it was reorganized as the “Greater Tumen Initiative,” excluding both the DPRK and 
the directly environmental element from its original approach, White noting that “…Its objectives were regional 
stability, economic cooperation, and sustainable growth… .”5 TRADP however did result in the formation of the 
5DVRQ6(=WKHHFRQRPLFSRWHQWLDORIZKLFKLVSHUKDSVRQO\QRZEHLQJIXOO\H[SORUHGDQGZKLFKKDVEHHQDQD-
lyzed extensively within the pages of Sino-NK,6 North Korea Economy Watch,7 and through the work of Choson 
Exchange’s Andray Abrahamian.8         
7KHGHYHORSPHQWVDW5DVRQWKHFROODSVHRI75$'3DQGLWVUHFRQ¿JXUDWLRQDVWKH*7,FRXSOHGZLWKZLGHU
patterns of institutional development and approach within the DPRK suggests that change may be afoot on the 
banks and at the mouth of the Tumen. Perhaps we are witnessing a paradigm shift at the loci of environmental 
4 Emma White, “Tumen River: The Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI),” April 15, 2010.
5 Ibid.
6 Sabine van Ameijden, “Revolution on the Margins? Surveying the Trade Environment in Rason,” Sino-NK, May 24, 2012.
7 “Rise in Popularity of Rajin Port,” Institute for Far Eastern Studies, November 30, 2012.
8 Andray Abrahamian, “$&RQYHUJHQFHRI,QWHUHVWV3URVSHFWVIRU5DVRQ6SHFLDO(FRQRPLF=RQH,” KEI Working Paper Series, Feb-
ruary 24, 2012.
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approach and institutional action, the focus of DPRK policy and approach in relation to the Tumen River becom-
ing no longer the classical narrative appropriation of the watercourse in which it is narratologically co-opted for a 
supportive role within the nation’s narrative of legitimacy and revolutionary struggle. Nor is the Tumen seemingly 
co-opted into the role on non-sentient topographic silent partner within the DPRK’s new narratives of environ-
mental legitimacy and appropriateness. Perhaps instead institutional and narrative direction relating to the Tumen 
has moved away from the river itself, away from its position as simple watercourse and geographic and political 
boundary between the DPRK and foreign powers, towards ultimately the river’s destination itself. What the Tu-
men is in the process of becoming in the institutional narratology and approach of the DPRK is a conduit towards 
the solution of geo-political issues that have beset it since the collapse of the Soviet Union, that is, in-spite of its 
border geography bequeathed it by the collapse of Chinese power at the hands of Tsarist Russia and Imperial Ja-
pan at the end of the nineteenth century, its necessary capture by the supportive yet encapsulating frameworks of 
Chinese interest and the economic and geographic usurpation by its western coast. Perhaps the Tumen will serve, 
in the new frameworks currently shifting and under construction and in league with the revived interests of the 
Russian Federation, just as the rain water falls on the western slopes of Mt Baekdu, to ease the passage of DPRK 
interests and direction to the sea and to wider world.
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Featured Essay Three
Rason: Sights and Sounds
by Andray Abrahamian
0DQ\RIP\PRUHIRUPDO¿QGLQJVRQ5DVRQKDYHEHHQ¿OHGLQEORJSRVWVDQGUHSRUWVDW&KRVRQ([FKDQJHRU
elsewhere.  Thus, I’ve decided to take Sino-NK’s request for a report as a more open-ended task that allows 
PHWRUHÀHFWDQGVKDUHREVHUYDWLRQVWKDWVXFKUHSRUWVZHUHOHVVVXLWHGWRFDSWXULQJ
²$QGUD\$EUDKDPLDQ([HFXWLYH'LUHFWRU&KRVRQ([FKDQJH
I was traveling along the border in summer, 2010. Reports around that time suggested that the then-new local 
travel permit was easy to get. It was not. So I, like so many South Korean tourists before and since, settled for 
picnicking on a hill in Tumen, marveling across the river at ordinary people doing ordinary things.
“Look at that: that girl is playing with a ball.”
“Wow.”
“Look, that farmer is digging a hole.”
“Fascinating.”
There are few countries where such events would seem so amazing.
But when in the subsequent summers of 2011 and 2012 I was able to visit Rason proper, it was the little things 
that would be so unremarkable elsewhere that I found again drawing my attention. I have spent considerable time 
talking to people who have far greater experience in Rason than I, including local residents. Here, however, I will 
note some of the ‘little things’ I directly observed and see if they can be tied into greater things.
THE ROAD | In terms of large-scale and obvious things, the greatest change between 2011 and 2012 was the 
completion of a modern, two-lane road connecting the Chinese border to Rajin. Transport links are the backbone 
IRUDQ\LQGXVWULDOO\PLQGHG6SHFLDO(FRQRPLF=RQH6(=,PSURYLQJFDSDFLW\KHUHRQHKRSHVZLOOVRPHGD\
WUDQVODWHLQWRDVLJQL¿FDQWLPSURYHPHQWLQWKHTXDOLW\RIOLIHRIORFDOVDVWKHRWKHUSLOODUVRIDQHFRQRPLF6(=DUH
also addressed.
What this road makes more immediately clear, however, is that suddenly people are linked to the other villages 
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and towns in the zone like never before. Biking has suddenly become much faster, as has walking. The arduous 
slog through mud during the rainy season and enduring the choking dust during the dry months of summer are 
now gone. A new joint-venture bus service also plies inter-city routes. One local told me that it was cheaper than 
other bus services.       
9LOODJHVE\WKHURDGDUHQRORQJHUEDWKHGLQFRQVWDQWGXVWDQG¿OWKIURPSDVVLQJWUDI¿FVRDLUTXDOLW\KDVLP-
proved. That said, the speed at which people now drive on the road is truly menacing and locals have yet to adapt. 
I daresay there have been some tragedies since last August.
THE CHINESE TOURISTS | Chris Green chided me online once for saying Kaesong was ‘clogged’ with bicycles, 
so I will refrain here from asserting that Rason was ‘packed’ with Chinese tourists. (I’m all for accurate verbs.) 
Therefore, let us say: it appeared, based on a few days’ observation and conversations with locals, that the number 
RI&KLQHVHWRXULVWVKDGLQFUHDVHGVLJQL¿FDQWO\
Hotels were largely sold out and the one in which we had made reservations for four rooms told us that they 
The road to Rason, 7 km away | Source: © Andray Abrahamian
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had only two for us and we’d have to share. This was considered unacceptable by our delegation and instigated a 
tour of the zone’s hotels in search of a place with four rooms. Everywhere was full (or perhaps not available for 
westerners).1
:H¿QDOO\IRXQGRQHLQWKH5DMLQ+RWHOEXWRQO\RQWKHWKÀRRUWKHKLJKHVWRQH7KHHOHYDWRURQO\IXQFWLRQHG
IRUDEULHIZLQGRZRIWLPHHDFKGD\GXHWRHOHFWULFLW\VKRUWDJHVRUVRPHRWKHUXQVSHFL¿HGPDOIXQFWLRQ7KHQH[W
day we made a fuss about moving (“again?” *sigh*) and ended up at a rather pricey guesthouse that appeared to 
EHGHVLJQHGZLWKKLJKRI¿FLDOVLQPLQG7KHNDUDRNHEDUKDGDEXEEOHPDFKLQH
Chinese tourists seemed to be everywhere; separate and distinct from the trade fair participants, who were 
mostly tasked with sitting in the un-air conditioned exhibition hall all day. The self-drive visas that Rason had 
tinkered with in 2011 were in effect by 2012. There was a line of self-drivers at the border when we crossed. They 
could be found doing normal things such as: blaring techno from a car stereo and dancing at a beach picnic; pull-
ing up to restaurants, deciding against the menu and then driving away; and perhaps inevitably, littering out the 
car window. This isn’t meant to make them sound crude, although now that I’ve written it down it certainly reads 
that way. Rather, it was just so normal.
A simple Chinese/English language conversation with one beachgoer:
“How’s North Korea”?
“It’s okay.”
“Yeah?”
“The beach is good.”
The Kenneth Bae saga may scare off some western tourists, but these are but a drop in the bucket.2 No matter 
how that situation plays out over the next few months, the beaches, gambling and newfound convenience will 
probably keep attracting Chinese tourists.
:KDWWKLVKHLJKWHQHG&KLQHVHSUHVHQFHLPSOLHVIRU5DVRQLVDVLJQL¿FDQWSROLF\GLUHFWLRQWKH1RUWK.RUHDQ
ORFDORI¿FLDOVKDYHKDGWRUHOLQTXLVKDORWRIFRQWURORYHUWKHVH&KLQHVHJXHVWV,ILQGHHGDV,ZDVWROGWKHUHDUH
now 900 tourists a day in the summer months, there is simply not the capacity to ‘mind’ all these visitors. It has 
EHHQMXGJHGWKHUHIRUHWKDWWKH\GRQ¶WSRVHDVXI¿FLHQWWKUHDWWRXVHOLPLWHGUHVRXUFHVPRQLWRULQJWKHP
CONSUMERISM |7KHWUDGHIDLULQZDVWKH'35.¶V¿UVWHYHURXWVLGH3\RQJ\DQJVRORFDOVGLGQ¶WUHDOO\
know what to make of it. But the sequel in 2012 saw people ready for retail. It was clear that RMB had been saved 
up and was being spent on all manner of clothes, medicines and other consumer goods. One American clothing 
company representative carried with him more product than he’d brought the previous year, sold out of it in a few 
hours, and then spent the remaining days of the fair apologizing for not having anything left to peddle. Carpets 
1  The contrast with Rason hotel accommodation in the period 2006-2008 can be felt by reading the book by former British Ambas-
sador to the DPRK John Everard’s 2012 book Only Beautiful Please. Everard, J. Only Beautiful Please: A British Diplomat in 
North Korea$VLD3DFL¿F5HVHDUFK&HQWHUSS
2  For more on Kenneth Bae, see Adam Cathcart, “The Prisoner: Questioning the Kenneth Bae Narrative” Sino-NK, March 23, 2013.
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were a big seller, with pairs of Koreans frequently carrying them off home.
The market in 2012 was similarly bustling, with at least equal but seemingly more goods on display as the 
SUHYLRXV\HDU,QRQHRI¿FLDOWROGPHWKH\ZHUHSODQQLQJWRGRXEOHWKHVL]HRIWKHPDUNHW7KLVKDGIDLOHGWR
KDSSHQEXWWKHRI¿FLDOFRYHUHGPDUNHWLVVWLOODVODUJHDVWZRIRRWEDOO¿HOGV7KHUHLVDODUJHXQFRYHUHGRXWGRRU
area around that and then devolution to less formal sellers in nearby alleys.
7KHUHZDVDQHOGHUO\PDQEHJJLQJZKRUDWKHUDJJUHVVLYHO\JUDEEHGP\ZULVWZKHQ,FDUHOHVVO\ÀDVKHGD
50%QRWHDURXQG+LVQDLOVZHUHORQJDQGEULWWOHOLNHÀLQW+HFRXOGKDYHERXJKWEDJVRIVRMXLQWKHPDUNHW
with that single note.
Rason trade fair | Source: © Andray Abrahamian
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CONSTRUCTION | On what appeared to be North Korean construction projects, things were moving at one might 
call a traditional pace. A multi-use sports and leisure complex looked hardly improved upon from 2011-2012. I 
noted a single person working on it one afternoon.
The exterior of the Tumen Triangle Bank, which is ostensibly in charge of banking transactions in and out 
RI5DVRQZDVQHDUO\GRQHWKRXJKWKHLQWHULRUZDVXQ¿QLVKHG7ZHOYHPRQWKVHDUOLHUWKHVKHOOKDGORRNHGFRP-
pleted.
One of the hotels we tried in our quest for western comforts was undergoing refurbishment. Here several 
people worked and materials lay about in a manner suggesting things were happening. Perhaps that is because the 
immediate rewards from catering to tourists were motivating a greater degree of focus.
The big construction project for the year was a mixed-use residential, retail and logistics complex being built 
by a Chinese company.  This was a fully modern operation, with multiple new cranes and other equipment. At the 
trade fair, the miniature mock-ups of the complex were a big draw.
Work goes on outside the Northeast Asia Hotel in Rason | Source: © Andray Abrahamian
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GOING FORWARD? | 5DVRQ¶VGHYHORSPHQWVWLOOIDFHVVLJQL¿FDQWKXUGOHV%XWSHRSOH,WDONHGWRZHUHJHQXLQHO\
proud that they were from a special part of the DPRK. “Even Pyongyang doesn’t have a hotel as good as The 
Emperor,” one boasted. (It’s true.)
People thought the road was a big deal: also true. Being in a “special” part of North Korea has also meant ac-
cess to hard currency and food supplies to a degree that many other Koreans lack. People generally seemed eager 
DQGH[FLWHGWKDWWKLQJVDUHPRYLQJLQDSRVLWLYHGLUHFWLRQIRUWKHLUUHJLRQ2QHRI¿FLDOSRVLWLYHO\EHDPHGZKHQ,
said I thought Rason was going to play an important role in the development of his country.
While the massive investments that Rason’s Economic Cooperation Bureau are hoping for have yet to come, 
small and medium sized businesses from across the border continue to try to gain a foothold, anticipating contin-
ued growth and improvement in the economic and political environment. Employment in joint-ventures is likely 
to continue to slowly grow and with it more disposable hard currency earnings.
In the short term, the increasing number of Chinese tourists will probably have the biggest economic and 
social effect on Rason citizens.
“What do you really think of Chinese people?” I asked our security guy one evening.
“We’re brothers!” he said with a shit-eating grin and clapped my shoulder.
I held his gaze for a beat, raising my eyebrows into a kind of hairy question mark. Then we both laughed at 
how little he meant what he said.
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Featured Essay Four
Locked in a Battle with the Market
by Jang Jin-sung
Why is the study of North Korea’s marketization relevant to the Tumen Triangle Project? On the understand-
ing that we are searching for nodes of change in North Korea, Jang argues that the marketization of North 
Korea has been—and continues to be—the fundamental “region” within which all other nodes of change 
FDQH[LVW
-DQJEHJLQVZLWKDQDFFRXQWRIZK\LQWKH¿UVWSODFHPDUNHWDFWLYLWLHVZHUHDOORZHGLQDVRFLDOLVWSODQQHG
economy. He describes how this event led to a loss of economic control on the part of the regime. In the 
second section, we are presented with a study of how the erosion of the economic umbilical cord between 
the people and state led to an erosion of the people’s psychological dependency on the state. This tendency 
ZDVVWUHQJWKHQHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKHPDUNHWSODFHIDFLOLWDWHGQRWRQO\HFRQRPLFH[FKDQJHVEXWLQIRUPDWLRQ
H[FKDQJHV
7KHQH[WVHFWLRQRIWKHVWXG\H[SODLQVKRZWKHFKLOGUHQRIWKH1RUWK.RUHDQHOLWHEHJDQWRH[SORLWWKLVQHZ
³FXUUHQF\RIPRQH\´IRULQGLYLGXDOSUR¿WV7KHLUNQRZOHGJHRIDQGKROGRQWKHPDUNHWVSUHYHQWHGWKHROG
guard of political elite from fully recovering control over the economic life of its subjects. This does not 
PHDQ-DQJDUJXHVLQWKH¿QDOVHFWLRQWKDWWKHVHFKLOGUHQRIWKHHOLWHDUHDQWDJRQLVWLFWRZDUGVWKHUHJLPH
In fact, they conduct their economic activities through Party and military institutions.
The study of North Korea’s marketization leaves us with the conclusion that change from below has im-
pacted not only North Korean society in general, but even the highest levels of North Korean elite.  We are 
reminded that as opposed to change instigated from above, change from below is a powerful and lasting 
change.
—Shirley Lee, Editor, New Focus International
LEFT WITH NO CHOICE: WHY MARKETS WERE ALLOWED AT ALL | Until the early 1990s, there were no 
markets in North Korea. There was only production and distribution within the planned economy. Markets were 
allowed only in the form of farmers’ markets, which Kim Il-sung had allowed in order to narrow the gap between 
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the city and countryside. When the Public Distribution System collapsed in 1994 and famine spread throughout 
the country, the DPRK regime – sensing a potential threat to the systematic status quo – decided that basic food 
necessities such as rice, salt and vegetables could be sold through the farmers’ markets.1 As the regime had lost 
the ability to provide, it was an inevitable decision. Nevertheless, there were more people selling household pos-
sessions on the markets – in order to buy rice – than people selling rice. Before the regime could enforce it, the 
farmers’ markets went beyond circulating “basic food necessities” and became more broadly commercialized.2
Until 1995 however, the majority of North Koreans remained employed in their state jobs and did not par-
ticipate in such market activities. This is because they were waiting for the PDS to resume handouts again. The 
Kim Jong-il regime decided that to admit the collapse of the PDS would lead to instability, and made no mention 
of its collapse. As the handouts did not come and an increasing number of people began to starve to death, North 
.RUHDQV¿QDOO\OHIWWKHLUVWDWHMREVDQGORRNHGIRUZD\VWRVXUYLYHRXWVLGHWKHV\VWHP7KHUHJLPHQRZIDFHGWZR
crises: famine and mass resignations. Reluctantly, it loosened control over the markets. This was the beginning of 
commercialization without state interference.3
DRIVING CHANGE: MARKETS LEAD TO NORTH KOREA’S TRANSFORMATION | In early 1996, the regime 
ordered for state departments to feed their employees through independent earnings. From then on, companies 
mushroomed in number, although many were nothing but in name. This was because the only foreign currency 
UHVHUYHLQ1RUWK.RUHD2I¿FHDQGUHVSRQVLEOHIRU.LP-RQJLO¶V:RUNHUV¶3DUW\IXQGVNHSWWKHLUGRRUV
¿UPO\VKXW(YHQZKHQJRYHUQPHQWPLQLVWHUVUHTXHVWHGIXQGVWRWUDYHODEURDGLQVHDUFKRIIRRGDLGQRDOORZ-
ances were made.4 
What North Korea had to offer was its natural resources. In exchange for coal, minerals and timber, Chinese 
merchants would offer rice. If the regime had allowed even this kind of basic bartering to continue, the famine 
may not have been so devastating. Nevertheless, in 1997 Kim Jong-il said that such exchanges brought him no 
payments in ‘”loyalty cash” and ordered that international trades must be conducted in exchange for currency. 
This led to stagnation in Sino-North Korean trade and the imports of rice slowed to a trickle. Moreover, some 
Chinese merchants who had trusted the North Korean framework and made investments went into debt.
After this event, many Chinese merchants stopped trusting the North Korean system, and requested for all 
imports to be paid for in cash. North Korean trade was therefore conducted not through companies or institutions, 
but primarily though individuals who had money. Anyone who had money – regardless of experience—came to 
be in demand by the DPRK authorities. This is the point at which the job assignment policies of the Workers’ 
Party began cracking at the seams. It also began to shift the people’s trust in the old framework and traditional 
1  Andrew S. Nastios, The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of  Peace Press, 2001).
2  Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
3  Andrei Lankov, “Famine in Paradise,” Asia Policy, No. 5 (Jan. 2008), 193-196.  
4  Ambassador James Hoare notes that DPRK ministers, diplomats, and other functionaries did have money to go abroad in this period, 
and certainly spent it. 
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worldviews.
7KH¿UVWPDMRUFKDQJHEURXJKWRQE\WKHPDUNHWVZDVWKDWWKHFXUUHQF\RIOR\DOW\OHVVHQHGLQYDOXHDVWKHFXU-
rency of money increased in importance.
Secondly, the emphasis on communal solidarity gave way to an individualistic struggle to survive.5 Those who 
had lived for and were rewarded by the loyalty system came to trust in the value of individual efforts instead, as 
DQLQFUHDVLQJQXPEHURISHRSOHOHIWRI¿FLDOVWDWHMREVDQGWXUQHGWRWKHSULYDWHPDUNHWVWRIHHGWKHPVHOYHV:KHQ
the regime could not provide for the people, they lost control over the economic life of the people. 
Thirdly, a new space for information exchange came into being. To understand the patterns of supply and de-
mand required access to information ahead of others, and North Koreans realized that the key to staying ahead of 
others was quicker access to information.
Food is what determines prices in the North Korean economy. As the North Korean regime relies on food aid 
from the outside world, to get access to this information before others allowed one to predict the direction of the 
market. This information did not exist in isolation, but alongside other information regarding the outside world. 
Ultimately, markets provided a catalyst for actively seeking information that had its source outside North Korea.
IMPOSSIBLE TO KILL: THE ELITE WHO CONTROL THE MARKETS | North Korea began to transform at an 
DODUPLQJVSHHGZKHQWKHFKLOGUHQRIWKHHOLWHZKRKDGNQRZQRQO\SROLWLFDOFDSLWDOUHDOL]HGWKHYDOXHRI¿QDQFLDO
capital. These new elite bought all kinds of cheap goods from Chinese merchants and then sold them in the North 
Korean markets at higher prices.6 This even led to distinctions between wholesale and retail prices.
Nevertheless, the North Korean economy is based on imports and consumption rather than on production and 
FRQVXPSWLRQ2QO\LQWHUPVRIUKHWRULFLV1RUWK.RUHDD³VHOIVXI¿FLHQW´VWDWHDVHFRQRPLFDOO\LWLVUHOLDQWRQ
the outside world. Only a year after the growth of these markets, the country became saturated with imports that 
FRXOGQRW¿QGEX\HUV$QLQFUHDVLQJQXPEHURIHOLWHLQFXUUHGGHEWVWR&KLQHVHPHUFKDQWVDQGWKLVFULVLVHYHQOHG
to murder in some cases. The North Korean regime responded by abolishing all trading companies that were in a 
¿QDQFLDOPHVVWKHQLPSRVHGUHVWULFWLRQVVRWKDWRQO\DOLPLWHGQXPEHURIJRRGVFRXOGEHLPSRUWHG
Yet at this time, the North Korean elite were speaking openly that while Kim Il-sung’s words were law, Kim 
Jong-il’s words were nothing but words. Powerful institutions such as the Party, the military and the security ap-
paratus took advantage of Kim’s one-man-rule by getting documents signed that could serve as an ultimatum in 
any sphere.  The companies run by the elite, now under Party or military rule, monopolized all import licenses for 
PLQHUDOV¿VKHU\DQGSURGXFWLRQEDVHVEHWZHHQWKHPVHOYHVDVWKHJRYHUQPHQWORVWWKHVHULJKWV$VWKHJRYHUQ-
ment lost power, the planned economy sunk into a deeper pit and the markets continued to grow stronger.
In order to revive companies that traded under government auspices, government minister Hong Seong-nam 
suggested to Kim Jong-il the implementation of the “representative system.” According to this system, shops, 
5  Edward P. Reed, “Famine’s Aftermath: Retrenchment or Reform,” in Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian 
Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea (USIP: Wash, 2005), 186-189.   
6  $QQD)LÀHOG´6HOOLQJWR6XUYLYHµFinancial Times, Nov. 19 2007.  
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and restaurants would be loaned to individuals or companies with earnings split 7:3. In this way, the markets—
currently outside of government control—could be reined in. Under Kim Jong-il’s orders, private markets were 
dissolved and then state markets were opened, selling goods at slightly lower prices. Many individuals supported 
this scheme, thinking that this was the only way forward. 
7KHSODQSURYHGWREHDPLVHUDEOHIDLOXUH7KH¿QDQFLDOHOLWHZKRDOUHDG\KDGJRRGDFFHVVLQIRUPDWLRQKDG
prepared for the lowering of prices and quickly undercut the state markets. As a downward spiral of competitive 
undercutting broke out between the state markets and private markets, Kim Jong-il ordered for the “representa-
tive system” to be scrapped only a year into its implementation. Even this could not go according to his wishes. 
Especially in the case of state restaurants, they had already become “marketized” by being redecorated etc. with 
capital from private investment. As the “representative system” had fused private and state economic activities, 
the government would be committing suicide by killing it off.
5HDOL]LQJWRRODWHWKDWWKHURRWRIKLVSUREOHPVZDVWKHQHZ¿QDQFLDOHOLWH.LP-RQJLORUGHUHG6HFWLRQRI
the Party’s Organizational Committee (the department in charge of exposing follies committed by the Party elite) 
to monitor this elite. In addition, forbid these young entrepreneurs to be employed in any company that dealt with 
IRUHLJQFXUUHQF\+RZHYHUWKLVNLQGRIUHVWULFWLRQZRXOGJUHDWO\OLPLW1RUWK.RUHDQWUDGHDVWKHÀRZRIIRUHLJQ
currency was already rooted in the activities of this new elite. Moreover, according to their own words, wasn’t it 
patriotic to earn money for a state that lacked money?
7KHQHZ¿QDQFLDOHOLWHFRQGXFWWKHLUHFRQRPLFDFWLYLWLHVPDLQO\WKURXJK2I¿FHWKH3DUW\WKH*XDUG&RP-
mand, the KPA, the Department of National Security, and other power organs. These are North Korea’s tycoons. 
Working in companies that trade under Party or military auspices, they control all of North Korea’s imports and 
H[SRUWV8VLQJWKHLUFRQQHFWLRQVWKH\FRQWUROWKHGLUHFWLRQRIWKH1RUWK.RUHDQHFRQRP\8VLQJWKHLU¿QDQFLDO
FORXWWKH\HYHQFRQWUROQDWLRQDOSROLF\UHOHYDQWWRWKHLULQWHUHVWV7KLV\RXQJ¿QDQFLDOHOLWHKDYHHYHQFRPHWR
purge the power elite.
PYONGYANG ATTACKS THE MARKET, AND LOSES: THE 2009 CURRENCY REFORM | In late November 
2009, when the PDS was all but collapsed and the markets could not be kept under control, the DPRK attempted 
DUHYDOXDWLRQRILWVFXUUHQF\7KHPRWLYHVIRUWKLVPRYHFDQEHVSOLWXQGHU¿YHPDLQKHDGLQJV8QGRLQJWKH
LQÀXHQFHRIWKHPDUNHWV5HFRYHULQJIXQGVWLHGWRWKHPDUNHWV6HYHULQJWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQPDUNHWV
and the currency exchange rate and nationalizing control over capital; 4) Limiting the autonomy of the markets; 
5 ) Stopping people’s increasing reliance on markets.7
In the past, currency reform would have been an attempt to strengthen the regime’s absolute control over the 
economy. The 2009 revaluation, however, was more of a desperate push for regaining control that had been lost 
to the markets. Even after the 7.1 Policy, the regime instigated a currency reform to control the markets, while at 
7  Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “The Winter of  their Discontent: Pyongyang Attacks the Market,” Policy Brief,  Peterson Insti-
tute for International Economics, Number PB 10-1, January 2010.  
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WKHVDPHWROHUDWLQJWKHLUH[LVWHQFH%HIRUHDOOSULFHVKDGEHHQVHWEXWDVPDUNHWVXQFRQWUROODEO\DURVHDOORI¿FLDO
prices collapsed. So the planned economy lost the 7.1 accepted market prices and repriced everything. 
The regime’s policy makers were not market savvy: they had already lost the ability to set prices, but tried to 
set prices again. The “reform” was meant to control markets; in other words: to stop the process of marketiza-
tion—eggs, for example, changing market prices. But the 7.1 Policy set prices for goods and increased salaries 
WRFRPSHQVDWH:KDWZDVQ¶WWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWZDVLQÀDWLRQ%HFDXVHWKH\PDGHSURJUHVVLQDWLPLGPDQQHUWKH
timing of the reform came too late and the market currency remained ahead of the national currency.
,W ZDV QRQH RWKHU WKDQ WKH UHJLPH¶V RI¿FLDOV WKDW FRQWULEXWHG WR WKLV PLVKDS$OUHDG\ LQ FRQWURO RI 1RUWK
Korea’s market, they had anticipated the regime’s attempt for currency reform in order to protect their personal 
wealth. As the US dollar increased in price and rumors of the looming currency reform spread, the price of goods 
plummeted. The 5000 won note—the highest ever limit set by the regime – missed its opportunity and lost its 
value. Anything under it was useless scrap paper and although the regime tried to execute the reform behind 
closed doors, it did not succeed.
The regime was looking through the eyes of a dictator and was seeing only the collective value of the markets, 
rather than how individual parts made the whole worth what it was. After the 7.1 policy, North Koreans started 
to put money before loyalty, as they grew accustomed to surviving through market activities. Yet the regime 
WUHDWHGWKHSHRSOHDVLIWKH\VWLOOSXWOR\DOW\¿UVWDQGWKLVZDVDIDWDOPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJ7KHUHJLPHVRXJKWRQO\
to undermine the value of the “marketplace” and did not consider how individuals felt ownership over each stake 
they owned. As far as each North Korean as concerned, Kim Jong-il was taking away what wealth they person-
ally owned. This is why the currency reform heightened the people’s displeasure at Kim Jong-il. Another grave 
misjudgment on Kim’s part was that he thought too little of how far the marketplace had established itself in the 
country. He had demanded a collectivism far too extreme from a people who had already moved towards indi-
vidualism out of necessity.
Moreover, perhaps because he was ruling over an “isolated” state, he ignored the force of the US dollar at his 
own peril. His thinking still stuck in the dichotomy of foreign currency for regime sustenance, domestic currency 
for ordinary North Koreans, he ignored the underlying connection between the two and tried to reform domestic 
currency without regard to its connection to the US dollar.
This proved even more disastrous for North Korea as the country lacks production and relies on imports. The 
K\SRFULV\RIWKHUHJLPH¶V³VHOIVXI¿FLHQWHFRQRP\´DQGWKHSUHWHQVHDWDQRQH[LVWHQWHFRQRPLFVWDELOLW\OHGWR
self-destruction. In today’s North Korea, there are two main classes to all intents and purposes. One consists of 
people belonging to the Party or military apparatus and living off the system. The other consists of those who live 
outside the system; these are the market classes. The struggle between the two classes continues.
PART TWO
FOCUS ON HOERYEONG AND RASON
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FOCUS ON... 
Corn, Crime, & Camp 22: Introducing Hoeryeong
by Mycal Ford
Hoeryeong City is located at coordinates 42.4333° N, 129.7500° E in North Hamgyeong Province of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It encompasses the city proper and thirty-four much smaller towns and 
villages.1 Presiding over the city is the Chief Secretary of the North Hamgyeong Provincial Committee of the 
Worker’s Party of Korea, O Su-yong.2 Further down the food chain is the Chief Secretary of the Municipal Com-
mittee of the Party, Kim Cheol.3 Due to the relatively higher degree of corruption apparent in the upper echelons 
of the local leadership in this particular city,4 the central party tends to have to exert its legitimacy by wiping the 
FLW\¶VIDFHFOHDURIEOHPLVKHGRI¿FLDOVIURPWLPHWRWLPH5 Part of this may be due to the fact that Hoeryeong is 
among a handful of privileged groups and places that more regularly receives state distribution than elsewhere, 
although this is modest in proportion, not coming close to the degree available in Pyongyang.6
/\LQJRQWKHHDVWHUQÀDQNRIDongbei, Hoeryeong lies across the Tumen River, a body of water that serves 
as a buffer zone between North Korea and China. Its population is an aggregate of 130,000, upon which a set of 
ZHDOWK\IDPLOLHVDQGRI¿FLDOVVLWVDWWKHXSSHUWLS7 The birthplace of the anti-Japanese heroine Kim Jong-suk (the 
PRWKHURI.LP-RQJLO+RHU\HRQJKRXVHVDPHPRULDOVSHFL¿FDOO\GHGLFDWHGWRKHURQ2KVDQGHRNDKLOO(YHU\
year, a pseudo-spiritual trip to Hoeryeong is made in honor of Kim Jong-suk; as a result, the city’s reputation is 
that of a “model city.”
$VDPRGHOFLW\+RHU\HRQJHQMR\VDPRGHVWLQÀX[RI&KLQHVHWRXULVWFXUUHQF\8 Tourists are granted access 
to the recently constructed Food Street, where burgeoning restaurants, as described by DPRK propaganda, adjoin 
1  38 North DPRK Digital Atlas
2  The DPRK Central Committee. Hong Sok-hyong preceded O Su-yong (2001-2010).
3  Moon Sung-hwee, “Food Distribution for Hoeryeong Last Month,” Daily NK, October 8, 2009.
4  “North Korea Today No. 329,” Good Friends, February 2010.
5  Yang Jung-ah, “Customs Director of Hoeryeong Arrested for Assisting in Drug Trade,” Daily NK, January 10, 2008.
6  “North Korea Today No. 434,” Good Friends, December 21, 2011.  See also Yongbum Shin, “Potatoes Replace Rice Ration in Ho-
eryeong,” Open Radio North Korea, August 2009.
7  “North Korea Today No. 268,” Good Friends, March 2009.
8  Choi Song-min, “Model City or Tourist Trap: Hoeryeong Sparkles,” Daily NK, October 15, 2012.
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new housing projects (built for military purposes, it is said). The central regime is keen to obtain hard currency, 
as we know, and seems to see Hoeryeong as one good way to do so in safety.
While Hoeryeong abuts the Tumen River, it still faces challenges of drought due to the deterioration of water 
supply systems, a phenomenon felt in all areas of North Korea.9 This has resulted in the depletion of potable water, 
DQGKDVIXUWKHUH[DFHUEDWHGWKHDXVWHUHOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQVLQZKLFKWKHFLWL]HQVDOUHDG\¿QGWKHPVHOYHV
,QWKHVXEVHTXHQWWZR\HDUVIROORZLQJ.LP-RQJLO¶VPRVWUHFHQWYLVLW+RHU\HRQJKDVIDFHGFRQÀLFWVEHWZHHQ
destitute farmers and the No. 5 Battalion of the No. 335 Prison Guard Regiment and the Border Guard Regiment, 
based in the Gyerim area of the city. At nightfall, the soldiers, bereft of food, would steal corn from the defenseless 
farmers, leaving them to go hungry. In response to the theft, the farmers would protest, stoking more civil unrest 
in the community.10
Located just twelve miles (twenty kilometers) further north east of the city-center is (or, perhaps, was) one 
of the most feared, bleak, and grisly detention centers in North Korea, Camp 22.11 Encircled by ten-foot electric 
wired fences supposedly carrying 3,300 volts, with land mines, traps punctuating the surface area, and an eight 
PHWHUPRDWZLWKVSLNHVLQLWVWUHQFKHVWKHWKLUW\RQHPLOHORQJDQGWZHQW\¿YHPLOHZLGH&DPSSURKLELWVRU
again, prohibited) the escape of 50,000 men, women and children. Also, directly inside the camp is a coalmine. 
In order to prevent uprisings from percolating, housing facilities are interspersed throughout the camp in small 
clusters. However, in spring 2012, news began to circulate that Camp 22 had been shut down.12         
Crime in Hoeryeong is often characterized by acts, which the state associates with espionage. The DPRK 
UHJLPHRIWHQKDVWRFOHQFKLWVLURQ¿VWDQGFRQ¿VFDWHDOOVXEYHUVLYHWHFKQRORJ\HJPRELOHGHYLFHVPXVLFWHO-
evision sets).13 One of the largest dispatches of State Security Ministry (ῃṖ㞞㩚⽊㥚⿖) agents in North Korea, 
LQFOXGLQJ¿IW\DJHQWVZDVVHQWWR+RHU\HRQJFLW\WRDEDWHDULVLQJHVSLRQDJHFRQÀDJUDWLRQ14 Most notably was 
WKH<XVDQFDVHUHIHUULQJWRDQHDUE\WRZQMXVWVRXWKZHVWRI+RHU\HRQJ(VVHQWLDOO\3DUW\RI¿FLDOVLQ<XVDQIDFLOL-
WDWHGFRUUXSWLRQEULEHU\DQGYDULRXVRWKHUNLQGVRIFROOXVLRQ7KHFODQGHVWLQHGHDOVGLGQRWUHPDLQFDPRXÀDJHG
too long before the Central Party launched a citywide investigation, which resulted in the replacement of six Party 
RI¿FLDOVLQ+RHU\HRQJFLW\DQGDSLWK\VWDWHPHQWFKLGLQJWKHFROOHFWLYHEHKDYLRURIWKHFLW\
Although Hoeryeong remains “special” due to its connection to Kim Jong-suk, its special rations, and its rela-
tively new but certainly exceptional access for foreign tourists, the city also represents certain universal qualities 
that we might associate with any given North Korean city of its size. The farming around the city is hardscrab-
ble; the water supply is terrible, and security is high. Although it remains hard to reach from other parts of the 
country—in part because state security does not wish for it to act as a major conduit for would-be refugees to the 
PRC—Hoeryeong remains, perhaps, a symbol of life beyond Pyongyang, and its struggles. 
9  UNICEF, “Water, Environment and Sanitation.”
10  Lee Seok-young, “Autumnal Corn Wars Breaking Out,” Daily NK, September 16, 2011.
11  Joshua Stanton, “Holocaust Now: Looking Down into Camp 22,” One Free Korea, Latest update October 2012.
12  “DPRK Premier Inspects Various Places in Hoeryeong City,” KCNA, September 17, 2012. 
13  Shin Joo-hyun, “Top Priority Is Sources’ Safety,” Daily NK, December 1, 2009.
14  Lee Beom-ki, “50 NSA Agents Cross Sino-NK Border at Sanhe,” Daily NK, December 22, 2012.
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FOCUS ON... 
The Closure of Camp 22
by Christopher Green1
Perhaps few things better indicate the parlous state of human rights in the DPRK than the country’s network 
of political prison camps. Hidden in some of the least accessible, mountainous parts of the country, this network 
of camps, amply documented by refugees and satellite imagery analysts alike, is used to arbitrarily detain an es-
timated 0.5% to 1% of the entire population.2 
Given the gravity of the situation, it was natural that excitement would greet reports last summer that the 
DPRK government had closed one of six camps believed to remain in existence: Camp 22, which lay near the 
border city of Hoeryeong. 
Accounts published at the time revealed details of the movement process, which took the three months from 
March 2012, when the harsh winter weather eased off, until June the same year. 
3ULVRQHUVZHUHPRYHGRYHU WZRQLJKWV LQVSULQJVRXUFHVUHSRUWHG¿UVWDJHQWVIURPWKH0LQLVWU\RI6WDWH
Security locked down the small border city, and then prisoners were locked in sealed trucks and taken to Ho-
eryeong’s main train station. From there they were transferred to freight cars and transported south toward the 
port city of Cheongjin.  Residents of two nearby counties, Saebyeol and Eundeok, were brought in to maintain the 
site, continuing with the farming and mining activities that have long sustained the area. 
Many of the 1,500 plus refugees who escaped across the Tumen River during 2012 were from the region, and 
PRVWVDLGWKH\KDGKHDUGDERXWWKHFORVXUHRI&DPS7KH¿QDOGHFLVLRQWRDEDQGRQWKHFDPSZDVDSSDUHQWO\
taken shortly after Kim Jong-un came to power at the end of 2011. Some, though by no means all, said that it was 
inspired by the defection of the camp warden, which would have been a catastrophic security breach if true. 
Though the reason behind the closure has still not yet been compellingly established, subsequent analysis of 
1  Originally published as “Hopes Spike on Camp Closure” by Asia Times [online] on January 26, 2013.
2  Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Repression and Punishment in North Korea: Survey Evidence of  Prison Camp Experiences,” 
East-West Center Working Papers, Politics, Governance, and Security Series, No. 20, October 2009.  
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satellite imagery by the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea did uncover further evidence of the 
closure itself.3 In particular, it showed that a building said by former inmates to be the camp’s infamous detention 
and interrogation facility had been razed to the ground. Given that the building will have been the scene of many 
RIWKHPRVWHJUHJLRXVKXPDQULJKWVDEXVHVWKDWZHQWRQLQWKHFDPSWKLVUHSUHVHQWV¿UVWFODVVHYLGHQFHRIDQHV-
sential step in efforts to cover up what went on there. 
Irrespective of the rationale, a number of experts are predisposed to view the closure as a positive step for-
ward. Former Soviet diplomat Dr. Alexandre Mansourov went on record at the analysis website 38 North to say 
that the closure may be evidence of a more developmental North Korean approach, commenting in an op-ed piece 
that it “could have been initiated to erase the evidence of past injustices and atrocities, or may be [an early sign] 
of political decompression set in motion by the new regime.”4
However, optimism is fraught with danger where North Korea’s ethno-nationalist dictatorship is concerned, 
and alternative explanations abound. Sadly, the greater likelihood is that the Ministry of State Security, the state 
entity that operates the political prison camp system, concluded that it is no longer capable of guaranteeing the 
security of border areas of North Hamgyeong Province. 
In this scenario, the question of whether or not the warden of Camp 22 defected matters little: that the camp lay 
just eight kilometers from the outskirts of Hoeryeong City and a stone’s throw from the Chinese border will have 
been concern enough, and the battle was surely lost once the ruling Korean Workers’ Party decided in 2010 that 
the downtown core of the city should be remodeled into a tourist destination, one in keeping with the municipal-
ity’s impeccable revolutionary heritage as the hometown of none other than Kim Jong-il’s mother, Kim Jong-suk. 
Interestingly, there may now be another, even more disastrous situation for optimists to contend with, as evi-
dence has emerged that another of the network of camps, the more readily defended Camp 14 at Gaecheon, has 
recently been enlarged.
Building on an already formidable reputation for squeezing information from satellite images that others 
simply cannot see, Curtis Melvin, the steward of North Korea Economy Watch, has seemingly discovered an 
additional detention facility to the west of the original, which opened in 1960 but has been rendered infamous in 
recent years by Escape from Camp 14 hero Shin Dong-hyuk.5
As Melvin himself has noted, it is too soon to be absolutely sure what this mysterious outgrowth of Camp 14 
really is. It may, in fact, be nothing at all. However, if it turns out to be a new section of Camp 14, then it may 
yet take us one step closer to knowing what happened to the prisoners formerly interned in Camp 22. Alas, it will 
DOVRWDNHXVRQHDOPLJKW\VWHSIXUWKHUDZD\IURP¿QGLQJFDXVHIRURSWLPLVPDERXWWKHIXWXUHXQGHU.LP-RQJXQ
3  Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Amy Opperman, and Katelyn Amen. “North Korea’s Camp No. 22 – update,” DigitalGlobe Analysis 
Center and Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) Report December 11, 2012.
4  Alexandre Mansourov, “Kim Jong Un’s Domestic Policy Record in His Frist Year: Surprisingly Good,” 38 North, January 15, 
2013.
5  Curtis Melvin, “Speculation time: A new kwan-li-so?” North Korea Economy Watch, January 18, 2013.
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FOCUS ON... 
The North Korean Prison Camp System
by Greg Scarlatoiu
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER KIM JONG-UN | Despite speculation that North Korea’s new leader may be willing to 
consider steps towards implementing economic reforms, evidence of such steps has been sparse. While the situa-
tion in the North Korean countryside continues to remain dire, and hunger and poverty prevalent, Kim Jong-un’s 
apparent propensity for modernity appears to be the result of a “low-level restiveness within the economic and 
political elite of Pyongyang to provide more space for them to consume and to have more access to information.”1
Since Kim Jong-un took power after his father’s death, there has been no indication that North Korea’s abys-
mal human rights situation has improved.2 Kim Jong-un’s dilemma is that he will be unable to depart from his 
father’s legacy until he has fully established himself as the new ruler of North Korea. The longer he spends 
strengthening his position based on the same system of brutal repression, the less of a chance he will have to break 
away from his birthright to inhumanity.
Although the overall human rights situation appears to be unchanged, a recently reported development elicits 
attention and further research: the reported closure of Political Prison Camp No. 22 (Hoeryeong, North Ham-
gyeong Province) and No. 18 (Bukchang, South Pyongan Province) and the apparent expansion of Camp 14 
(Gaecheon, South Pyongan Province) and Camp 25 (Cheongjin, North Hamgyeong Province).
 CAMP 22: CLOSED, DISMANTLED OR OPERATIONAL | According to former North Korean state security 
RI¿FLDOVZKRGHIHFWHGWR6RXWK.RUHDEHWZHHQDQGSULVRQHUVFRQWLQXHWREH LQFDUFHUDWHGDW
North Korea’s six active political prison camps (ὖⰂ㏢Vkwanliso), often members of up to three generations of 
1  Williams, Carol J, quoting Stephen Haggard. ”It’s Still ‘My Way’ or the Highway under North Korea’s Kim.” LA Times, July 13, 
2012. 
2  “Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea:” Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. September 13, 2012, 4.
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the same family. Based on testimony by former prisoners, the death rate in detention appears to be extraordinarily 
high. It is not clear whether the rate of new imprisonment is as high as the rate of deaths.3
In late September 2012, based on information received from sources inside North Korea, Radio Free Asia and 
Daily NK reported that Camp 22 had been dismantled in early 20124. Such reports indicated that the prisoners 
KDGEHHQUHORFDWHGDQGIDUPHUVIURPDGMDFHQWYLOODJHVKDGEHHQEURXJKWWRZRUNLQWKH¿HOGVIRUPHUO\IDUPHG
by prisoners. To further investigate these reports, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and 
DigitalGlobe, a leading global provider of high-resolution earth imagery solutions, initiated an imagery analysis 
of Camp 22 on October 1, 2012. While HRNK and DigitalGlobe have so far only published two reports on Camp 
22, the two organizations are in the process of examining the current situation at Camps 14, 18, and 25.5
Camp 22 (aka Korean People’s Security Guard Unit 2209) is located within Hoeryeong City. Sources have 
indicated that the camp covers approximately 225 square kilometers, but most activities are concentrated within 
WZRVPDOOHUSHULPHWHUV7KH¿UVWDUHDDERXWVTXDUHNLORPHWHUVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKORFDOFRDOPLQLQJRSHUDWLRQV
is located 20 kilometers north-northeast of Hoeryeong, among the villages of Chungbong-dong, Chungbong-ni, 
Sowonpo, and I-dong. The second area, about 1.5 square kilometers wide, reportedly housing camp headquarters, 
administration, and the main prisoner housing area, is situated 6.6 kilometers to the southeast and 19 kilometers 
to the northeast of Hoeryeong.
DigitalGlobe and HRNK compared a satellite photo of the camp taken on October 11, 2012 with DigitalGlobe 
images taken on November 5, 2010 and May 21, 20116. The satellite imagery analysis indicated that typical fall 
activity, such as harvesting, drying of crops, and thrashing, has proceeded at normal levels in and around the 
Haengyong-ni and Chungbong-dong areas of interest, with grain present in the courtyard of the camp’s thrashing 
houses. There has been a notable increase in the coal stockpile at the Chungbong-dong loading facility, suggesting 
a consistent or even increasing level of production.
The level of activity detected and the state of the agricultural, industrial and civil infrastructure, as revealed 
through satellite imagery, suggest that the camp remains operational. However, the North Korean military and in-
WHUQDOVHFXULW\RUJDQL]DWLRQVDUHIXOO\SUR¿FLHQWLQLPSOHPHQWLQJFDPRXÀDJHFRQFHDOPHQWDQGGHFHSWLRQ&&'
SURFHGXUHV7KHVDWHOOLWHSKRWRWDNHQRQ2FWREHUFRQ¿UPVUHSRUWVE\5DGLR)UHH$VLDDQG'DLO\1.WKDW
several small buildings have been razed, including one which had been reported by defectors to be a detention and 
interrogation facility. It would thus be unreasonable to refute a scenario involving the gradual transfer of small 
sections of prisoners out of Camp 22 and replacing them with “regular” farmers and laborers from other locations.
As indicated in reports on North Korea’s vast system of unlawful and arbitrary imprisonment, the prisoners 
3  Hawk. David. The Hidden Gulag Second Edition: The Lives and Voices of “Those Who Are Sent to the Mountains,” Committee 
for Human Rights in North Korea, April 8, 2012.
4  Moon Sung-hwee. “Why Did North Korea Shut Down Camp No. 22?” Radio Free Asia Korean Service. September 27, 2012, ac-
cessed September 27, 2012.
5  On February 25, 2013, HRNK released a report suggesting that Camp 25 at Cheongjin, North Hamgyeong Province had been 
expanded.
6  See generally Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Amy Opperman, and Katelyn Amen. “North Korea’s Camp No. 22” DigitalGlobe Analysis 
Center and Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) Report, October 22, 2012.
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suffer from severe induced malnutrition, and are equipped with just rudimentary tools. Satellite imagery indicates 
an increase in the coal production, but it is hard to imagine how the productivity of the slave labor employed at 
the Camp 22 coal mining operation could have improved. This could have been achieved through: feeding the 
prisoners better (hard to imagine, given all we know about the kwanliso system); increasing the number of prison-
ers at the camp (however, nothing in the satellite imagery indicates such a development); equipping the prisoners 
with better tools (inconceivable under the current circumstances in North Korea); or replacing the forced labor 
force with a more or less “regular” workforce from nearby villages, better fed, better equipped, and thus more 
productive.
After the release of the HRNK/DigitalGlobe report, Daily NK reported that sources inside North Korea had 
FRQ¿UPHGWKDWWKHSHRSOHIDUPLQJWKHODQGZLWKLQWKHFRQ¿QHVRI&DPSZHUHIURP³ORZFODVVIDPLOLHVIURP
the local counties of Saebyeol and Eudeok.”7 Radio Free Asia reported that miners from the Kungsim coal mine—
which has been allegedly closed—have been relocated to Camp 22 mining facilities, to replace the prisoner work 
force.87KHVDPHUHSRUWLQGLFDWHGWKDWVRXUFHVLQVLGH1RUWK.RUHDKDGFRQ¿UPHGWKDWWKHSULVRQHUSRSXODWLRQKDG
declined from 30,000 to 3,000, due to food shortages, and that the surviving prisoners had been relocated to Camp 
16 in Cheongjin.9
The debate over the status of Camp 22 has resulted in maintaining the North Korean political prison camp in 
focus, through reporting in the English and Korean language press. Fully aware of the importance of decidedly 
FRQ¿UPLQJRUUHIXWLQJUHSRUWVWKDWWKHIDFLOLW\KDVEHHQFORVHG+51.DQG'LJLWDO*OREHFRQWLQXHGWRIRFXVRQ
Camp 22, paying particular attention to relevant indicators.
On November 26, 2012, DigitalGlobe took additional satellite photos of Camp 22. A comparison with May 
21, 2011 and October 7, 2012 and the subsequent analysis focused on the perimeter fence and guard towers. Digi-
WDO*OREHDQG+51.FRQFOXGHGWKDWDVLJQL¿FDQWQXPEHURIWKHVPDOOHUJXDUGSRVWVDQGWRZHUVKDYHEHHQHLWKHU
razed or abandoned, and that about half of the perimeter fence has disappeared. Moreover, the bridge leading to 
the entrance to the Chungbong-dong rail station has also been removed. Although reports indicate that Camp 22 
has been completely shut down, one still needs to understand why some guard posts and towers appear to be cur-
UHQWO\RSHUDWLRQDO2QHSRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQFRXOGEHFDPSFRQVROLGDWLRQEXWZHZLOOKDYHGH¿QLWHFRQ¿UPDWLRQ
RQO\RQFHZHKDYHFRQ¿UPHGZLWKSULPDU\VRXUFHVRQWKHJURXQG
Reports stated the Kungsim mine was closed, and the “regular” workforce moved to the Chungbong-dong 
mine, to replace the prisoners who had been transferred elsewhere. Based on the satellite imagery, the Kungsim 
mine was closed, but only recently. Small-scale mining is still visible, and there appear to have been no recent 
large-scale changes to population patterns in the area.
While continuing to pursue new Camp 22 imagery and analysis as part of a broader collaboration with Digi-
talGlobe and also acquiring photos of Camps 14, 18, and 25, HRNK plans on working with South Korean human 
7  Kim, Kwang Jin. “New Farmers of Camp No. 22 Revealed.” Daily NK, October 25, 2012.
8  Moon Sung Hwee and Parameswaran Ponnudurai. “From Prison Camp to Coal Hub.” Radio Free Asia, November 6, 2012.
9  Ibid.
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rights groups that have been in contact with very recently arrived North Korean refugees from the Hoeryeong 
area who have provided information about the transformation of Camp 22. Ideally, defectors and former prisoners 
and guards will determine whether they can identify landmarks and other indices of changes within the present or 
former perimeter of Camp 22 should review the new satellite photos of Camp 22.
&RQ¿UPLQJWKHFXUUHQWVWDWXVRI&DPSVDQG²DQRWKHUkwanliso that has allegedly been dismantled—is 
essential to efforts to understand and improve the North Korean human rights situation. Reports by North Korean 
Economy Watch that Camps 14 and 25 have been expanded also elicit further attention and research. If, based on 
recent satellite imagery analysis and recent defector testimony, it is established that Camp 22 remains operational; 
DUHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHYHU\IHZDYDLODEOHVRXUFHVLQVLGH1RUWK.RUHDPD\EHQHHGHG,IWKHUHVHDUFKFRQ¿UPVWKDW
the remaining prisoners have been transferred and replaced by a “regular” workforce, the next step would be to 
determine if this was the result of stepped up international reporting on North Korea’s political prison camp sys-
tem.
If a dismantling of some of North Korea’s political prisoner camps is in progress, it is essential to ensure that 
the North Korean regime does not attempt to erase all evidence of atrocities committed at the camps, including 
the surviving prisoners. What is certain is that the North Korean regime’s hiding and distorting the harsh reality 
of North Korea’s unforgiving political prison camp system is no longer an option. With constant satellite imagery, 
we can maintain a watch over these camps even if no outside entry is allowed.
More than 120 states in the United Nations General Assembly have expressed “serious concern” about “the 
existence of a large number of prison camps and the extensive use of forced labor” in North Korea. If North Korea 
is trying to make a Potemkin village out of Camp 22, the world should know.
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FOCUS ON… 
Abandonment of Socialist Economy in the Periphery 
by Benjamin Young
Long seen by Pyongyang as the home of the least loyal citizenry, North Hamgyeong-ians have suffered greatly 
from an unfortunate distinction.1  During the “Arduous March” in the mid-1990s, urban residents of North Ham-
gyeong province arguably suffered more than any other segment of the North Korean population. In his book 
Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, Bradley K. Martin explains that it was due to the “grim condi-
tions” in April, 1992 in the North Hamgyeong province that “semi-retired” Kim Il-sung reacquainted himself with 
domestic issues and “the regime would move to new policies deemphasizing heavy industry in favor of activities 
that would more directly improve the people’s livelihood.”2 
In that same period, a new monument was constructed in the Myohyang Mountains with the slogan, “Water 
is rice. Rice is Communism. The irrigation-based-socialist agriculture of our country will have a great harvest 
every year.” Never mind focusing on directly improving the people’s livelihoods; costly monuments needed to 
be a priority in the so-called “People’s Korea.”  In this essay, I argue that the growing economic discrepancies 
between the peripheral regions (provinces) and the core (Pyongyang) have clearly emerged as an issue that the 
regime needs to address in the near future. North Korea still adheres to a socialist culture and a collective society, 
but the present economic arrangement of “one country, two systems” may spark a necessary change in the North 
Korean system to market socialism. The catalyst behind this reform may be the North Korean people themselves. 
In recent years, North Hamgyeong’s distance from Pyongyang and its rather permeable border with China has 
allowed North Hamgyeong-ians with contacts in China to fare better than even some Pyongyang residents. In De-
cember 2012, a new website run by North Korean exiles in South Korea, New Focus International , interviewed 
a recent defector from North Hamgyeong who remarked, “North Hamgyeong province seems a much better place 
1  Sun Joo Kim, ed., The Northern Region of Korea: History, Identity, and Culture (Seattle: Center for Korea Studies, University of 
Washingon, 2010).
2  Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leaders: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2004), 504.
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for life than the city of Pyongyang.”3 Another defector explained that it was a “shock… when he witnessed life in 
North Hamgyeong province.” In regards to the food situation, the defector explained that “in his home province, 
the family had barely enough watered down congee for eating; yet, in North Hamgyeong province there was rice.” 
Pyongyang, historically regarded by many North Koreans as the revolutionary center of the world, has in re-
cent years “provincialized.” New Focus International spoke to a member of the Pyongyang elite and he explained 
the new anarchist character of the capital city. He says, “The leadership is no longer respected. Fewer Pyongyang 
residents are prepared to offer an unquestioning loyalty and obedience to the state.”4 The provinces have relied 
on the black market since the centrally planned economy of North Korea crumbled during the famine in the mid-
1990s. However, Pyongyang’s symbolic status as the last bastion of true socialism slowed the arrival of the black 
market into the capital. As New Focus explains:
When Kim Jong-il realized he did not have enough food to feed the entire country, he made a 
decision to restrict the distribution of rations to those living within the boundaries of Pyong-
yang. He did everything in his power to sustain the symbolic authority of the PDS [Public 
Distribution System] in Pyongyang, so that the city could serve as a beacon of ideology and 
a model of absolute loyalty.5
1HZ)RFXVLGHQWL¿HV³)RUWKH¿UVWWLPH3\RQJ\DQJUHVLGHQWVDUHIHHOLQJWUDSSHGLQVLGHWKHFLW\UDWKHUWKDQ
trapped in the provinces, as the quality of life in the city continues to stagnate due to its distance from the vital 
black market trade that sustains the rest of North Korea.”6
The importance of rice to North Korean life cannot be understated. One could argue that wealth in North Ko-
rea is measured by the intake of rice rather than by deep pockets. As Chris Green, the editor of DailyNK explains, 
“Yes, rice is expensive. But, it has been “unnaturally” expensive for quite a long time. Indeed, it has been high 
IRUVRORQJQRZWKDW³QDWXUDO´DQG³XQQDWXUDO´SULFHSRLQWVKDYHDUJXDEO\ORVWDORWRIWKHLUPHDQLQJ,QÀDWLRQKDV
been more or less a constant feature since 2009, save for a handful of temporary corrections borne of agricultural 
and/or political factors.”7 Due to the high price of rice for many years and growing dissatisfaction with their gov-
ernment, North Koreans outside of Pyongyang have become reluctant to donate rice to the military.  New Focus 
LGHQWL¿HVWKDW³ZKHQDVNHGWRGRQDWHULFHWRWKHPLOLWDU\WKHSURYLQFHVDUJXHGWKDWWKH\ZHUHQ¶Wµ3\RQJ\DQJSHR-
ple’ because they did not receive rations… the rice of loyalty turned against the Pyongyang regime and became 
the rice of resistance.”8 
Despite the recent defector accounts citing positive developments in North Hamgyeong’s food situation, 
3  “North Hamgyong: Citizens Take Progress into Their Own Hands,” New Focus International, December 14, 2012.
4  “The Provincialization of Pyongyang Is Underway,” New Focus International, February 6, 2013.
5  Ibid.
6  Ibid.
7  Christopher Green, “Putting Food on the Table: Rice Back in the News,” Sino-NK, March 15, 2013. 
8  “The Provincialization of Pyongyang Is Underway,” New Focus International, February 6, 2013.
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sources from the Good Friends-NK Today website repeatedly explain that North Hamgyeongians are starving and 
barely obtaining any corn, let alone rice.9  A Good Friends-NK Today report from July 4, 2012 titled, “Even well-
RIIIDPLOLHVFDQRQO\DGGDKDQGIXORIULFHWRWKHLUFRUQPHDOSRUULGJH´LGHQWL¿HVWKDW³&RUQPDL]HORQJDJR
replaced rice as North Korea’s staple food. North Koreans call corn meal ‘corn rice.’ The well-to-do eat steamed 
rice; for others, corn is their staple food. Depending on a family’s economic status, the rice-to-corn ratio varies. 
Well-off families don’t use more than 50% corn; as the household budget becomes more strained, corn’s share 
grows.”10
Good Friends-NK Today remains an underutilized resource detailing the daily life of North Koreans, espe-
cially those living in the border regions near China. The stated goal of this non-governmental organization (NGO) 
is as follows: “Good Friends has been providing information on food shortages in North Korea, raising funds for 
humanitarian assistance, dispatching activists to national border areas between China and DPRK and having them 
investigate local situations, and publishing reports on food shortages in North Korea.” The UN reports that the 
food situation in North Korea as “being the best in many years,” but recent Good Friends-NK Today headlines, 
such as “Cannibalism in North Korea: Starving Father Kills Children for Food,” suggest otherwise.
On May 23, 2012, Good Friends-NK Today reported that, “Food shortages in the North Hamgyeong Province 
are leading residents to swarm to Rajin-Seonbong (also known as Rason), many without a pass attempted to enter 
the special district.”11 The article also noted that, “It is a widespread feeling that Rason is just as prosperous as 
Pyongyang with investments from foreign businesses. However poor they may be, a Rason resident could still 
afford to eat crushed corn, which is deemed a luxury in many areas.” This report runs contrary to reports which 
argue argue that Pyongyang, not the Sino-North Korea border areas, is descending into anarchy.12 
$P\ULDGRIVLPLODUUHSRUWVH[SODLQLQJWKHGLUHIRRGVLWXDWLRQLQ1RUWK+DPJ\HRQJ¿OOWKHSDJHVRIWKH Good 
Friends-NK Today website. For example a Good Friends-NK Today report from May 2, 2012 LGHQWL¿HVWKDWVDOW
has become a rare luxury in North Hamgyeong. A hospital worker in North Hamgyeong noted, “Various diseases 
are going around due to malnutrition caused by the food crisis and the high price of salt compared to corn. The 
unavailability of salt, bean paste, and soy sauce is not just an inconvenience; rather, it is a dangerous situation 
since serious health problems can occur. Salt has to be secured promptly without delay.” 
So what does the difference between the New Focus International and Good Friends-NK Today reports tell 
us about the general food situation in North Korea? The answer is that there is a substantial difference between 
the food situation in the provinces and the food situation in Pyongyang. The North Korean government’s curtail-
ment of citizen travel within its borders, permission of black market trade in the provinces, and heavy emphasis 
RQGLVSOD\LQJ3\RQJ\DQJDVD³PRGHUQ´VRFLDOLVWFLW\KDV¿JXUDWLYHO\VSOLWWKHQDWLRQLQWRWZR7KH³KDYHQRWV´
in the provinces who have either thrived or failed in the black market (depends on which report you look at) and 
9  http://goodfriendsusa.blogspot.co.uk
10  “North Korea Today No. 462,” Good Friends, July 4, 2012.
11  “North Korea Today No. 456,” Good Friends, May 23, 2012.
12  “The Provincialization of Pyongyang Is Underway,” New Focus International, February 6, 2013.
The Tumen Triangle Project
SinoNK.com50
“the haves” in Pyongyang who have lived a relatively comfortable life according to North Korean standards but 
are struggling to gain access to the black market in the periphery.
While there seems to be no historical evidence of a major rebellion against the North Korean government by 
its citizens, Victor Cha explains in the newly released volume North Korea in Transition, “domestic disturbances 
are not exactly unknown occurrences in the North.” Cha details a myriad of protest-related events in North Korea 
VLQFH,WLVQRVXUSULVHWKDWPDQ\RIWKHSURWHVWVHYHQIXOOÀHGJHGULRWVKDYHRFFXUUHGLQ1RUWK+DPJ\HRQJ
&KDQRWHVDSURWHVWLQZKHQ³VHQLRURI¿FHUVRIWKH9,FRUSVVWDWLRQHGLQ&KHRQJMLQ´EHFDPHGLVJUXQWOHGE\
“Pyongyang’s decision not to ship food to the Hamgyeong provinces” and  “sought to take control of a university, 
a communications center, Cheongjin port, and missile installations and reportedly planned to team up with the 
7th Corps in Hamheung to oppose the government.” In December 2007, the government banned market activity 
IRUZRPHQXQGHUWKHDJHRI¿IW\DQG³SURWHVWVVSUDQJXSLQ&KHRQJMLQZLWKLQPRQWKVZLWKIHPDOHSDUWLFLSDQWV
reportedly calling out, ‘If you do not let us trade, give us rations!’ and ‘If you have no rice to give us, let us trade.’” 
North Hamgyeong, “the bad boy” of the peripheral regions, is an area that Pyongyang needs to keep a close 
eye on as the rebellious nature of the province may soon be a problem that authorities can no longer control. Due 
to an increase in cell phone usage, North Hamgyeong-ians may once again team up with other disgruntled periph-
eral peoples and stage protests. Reports coming out of the DPRK indicate that the peripheral peoples are either 
succeeding or starving. Either way, Pyongyang will be forced to pay closer attention to the problematic peripher-
ies and address the current situation. If the peripheral peoples are succeeding, the wave of market socialism may 
soon arrive in Pyongyang and sweep away even the socialist culture that Pyongyang has long stood for. If the 
peripheral peoples are starving, Pyongyang will need to feed them or an even large protest may ensue.  
By itself, internal insurrection would not spark North Korea’s reform to market socialism but it is important 
to recognize that the North’s emphasis on socialist culture but neglect of socialist economy is extremely notice-
able to the average North Korean and indicates a weakness in the system. How soon until the socialist culture 
implodes? 
PART THREE
THINKING CRITICALLY ABOUT SOURCES
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“Statue Destruction Society:” 
North Korean Claims of Terrorism from Inside Chinese Territory
by Adam Cathcart and Brian Gleason
This past July 19, a very strange case emerged at a North Korean press conference where repentant former 
defectors asserted a US/South Korean “terrorist plot” to hit statues in the DPRK.
The press conference did not get a great deal of coverage; if anything, it seemed that it was being viewed as 
one of those bizarre instances of North Korea trying to mobilize its own people to vigilance.  Stephan Haggard 
saw it, however, as something more, perhaps as the North Koreans looking for a pretext to test a nuclear weapon 
and pin the US with a “terrorist state” label.1
Certainly the details of the conference, and the way that domestic propaganda has continued, indicated Pyong-
yang was using the episode as a way heighten war-readiness in North Korea. North Korean television has played 
up the theme of an all-around American plot to encircle the DPRK. Jon Yong-chol, the centerpiece of the press 
conference, has thus been seen in North Korean poster art and television broadcasts, his face a reminder to the 
populace. 
Secondary themes driven by the press conference were to render even more nefarious connotations to (illegal) 
cell phone calls on the northern frontier, and to send a warning shot to anyone who did not  ardently support the 
state’s drive to build and protect new statues.
However, as the following annotated document shows, the press conference and the campaign surrounding 
it primarily functions as a means of expressing anger at China, complaining about the laxness of Chinese border 
security, and new grievances about the PRC’s new ties with South Korean intelligence agencies.
 CONNECTING THE ALLEGATIONS TO SINO-DPRK RELATIONS | The July 19 press conference did not 
emerge out of a vacuum: North Korea had a very clear intended purpose for it.  We believe that the assertions are 
connected strongly to the Kim Young-hwan case, and indicate that that case did not get worked out completely to 
the North Korean satisfaction. Strong evidence exists to indicate that North Korea feels betrayed by the PRC in 
1  Stephan Haggard, “Spies and Sabotage,” North Korea: Witness to Transformation, July 27, 2012.
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the public discussion of defector issues and that the defector issue is becoming increasingly politicized between 
the two socialist allies themselves.
A brief look at the timeline may be of some use:
March 2: From the Korea Times: “President Lee Myung-bak called for Beijing’s cooperation over the 
issue of North Korean refugees in China during talks with the Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, 
in Seoul. The South, apparently breaking from its pattern of ‘quiet diplomacy’ over the repatriation 
policy, has become increasingly vocal on the matter. The National Assembly has also passed a resolu-
tion demanding an end to the policy.”2 
March 16: From Xinhuanet: “China voiced concern over the DPRK’s plan to launch a satellite in April. 
&KLQHVH9LFH)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU=KDQJ=KLMXQPHWZLWK-L-DHU\RQJ'35.DPEDVVDGRUWR&KLQDRQ
Friday to express China’s worry over the matter, according to a statement from the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry.”3
March 27:  From the AP: “Some of the North Korean fugitives who have taken refuge for many 
months in South Korean consulates in China will soon be allowed by Beijing to leave for Seoul, a 
report said Wednesday. ‘The Chinese government has an internal policy guideline, under which North 
.RUHDQVZKRKDYHEHHQOLYLQJLQ6RXWK.RUHDQFRQVXODURI¿FHVIRUPRQWKVRUPRUHZLOOEHDOORZHG
to leave the country,’ a diplomatic source told the daily.”
“Other North Koreans arrested across Chinese territory will be repatriated to the North under this 
guideline,” the source said. 4
 March 29: The Dong-a Ilbo reports: “Kim Young-hwan is abducted/arrested in Dalian, in the north-
eastern Chinese province of Liaoning, with three South Korean colleagues. After his release, Kim told 
DQHZVFRQIHUHQFH WKDW µ&KLQD¶V1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\0LQLVWU\RI¿FLDOVGLGQCWHYHQNQRZPXFKDERXW
ZKR,ZDVXQWLOWKUHHWRIRXUGD\VDIWHUP\DUUHVW¶0RUHRYHUµ7KHUHLVWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDW&KLQDGLGQCW
know how important Kim was until North Korea’s State Security Department provided information on 
KLPEHODWHGO\¶D6RXWK.RUHDQRI¿FLDOVDLG´5
Daily NK highlighted the strange circumstances surrounding the group’s subsequent incarceration, 
2  “Seoul urges China to stop repatriating NK defectors,” Korea Times, March 2, 2012.
3  “China concerns over DPRK’s planned satellite launch,” Xinhuanet, March 17, 2012.
4  “China to Let N. Koreans leave for S. Korea: report,” Associated Press, March 27, 2012.
5  “Did China torture activist for defectors with electric shocks,” The Dong-a Ilbo, July 28, 2012.
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including plausible North Korean involvement in the interrogation.6
April 4:$JURXSRI¿YH1RUWK.RUHDQGHIHFWRUVLQFOXGLQJRQHIDPLO\DUULYHGLQWKH6RXWKDIWHUKLGLQJ
for years at a South Korean consulate in China.
April 13: China joined the other members of the UN Security Council in a unanimous condemnation 
of the launch—a marked divergence from China’s previous stance of ‘urging calm and restraint’ in the 
wake of North Korea’s 2009 launch of the Unha-2 rocket.7
April 19: The Daily Yomiuri reports: “The Chinese government has suspended deporting North Korean 
defectors in accordance with a request from the South Korean government, according to sources work-
ing for Chinese and North Korean authorities.”8
July 12: The Daily NK reports: “PRC Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu arrived in South Ko-
UHDDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIDWKUHHGD\YLVLWWKH¿UVWE\DKHDGRI&KLQHVHSXEOLFVHFXULW\VLQFH6RXWK.RUHD
DQG&KLQDHVWDEOLVKHGGLSORPDWLFUHODWLRQVLQ«6RXWK.RUHDQRI¿FLDOVKDYHFRQ¿UPHGWKDWWKH
ongoing case of Kim’s detention will be raised, although they are cautious to avoid linking Meng’s 
YLVLWZLWKWKHUHOHDVHRIWKHIRXUPHQ«+RZHYHUSDVWYLVLWVE\&KLQHVHVHQLRURI¿FLDOVKDYHOHGWR
the arrival of ‘diplomatic gifts.’”9
July 18: NTI reports: “Defense experts suspect North Korea is developing compact nuclear weapons 
that could be detonated high above the Earth in an attack designed to disable rival nations’ electronic 
weapon systems, the Washington Times on Wednesday cited a new Chinese report as stating.”
Continuing, “The June report in a Chinese Communist Party-controlled publication said the recent 
disruption of some South Korean airplanes’ GPS capabilities had been linked to the North Korean 
military. Writing for the Hong Kong-based Bauhinia monthly journal, military analyst Li Daguang said 
North Korea’s developing capacities could undermine the South Korean military’s weapons and data 
and other resources.”10
July 20: 1RUWK.RUHDQKXPDQULJKWVDFWLYLVW.LP<RXQJKZDQZDV¿QDOO\UHOHDVHGRQ-XO\DIWHU
6  Yang Jung A, “North Korea Suspected in 4 Arrests,” Daily NK, June 16, 2012.
7  “China joins U.N. condemnation of N. Korea rocket launch,” CBS News, April 16, 2012.
8  For a report on the story, see Steven Denney, “Hopefully More than an Inch: Weekly Digest,” Sino-NK, April 19, 2012.
9  Cho Jong Ik, “Can Meng Complete the Kim Jigsaw?,” Daily NK, July 13, 2012.
10  “Chinese Experts Believe N. Korea Developing Nukes For EMP Attacks: Report,” Nuclear Threat Initiate (NTI), July 19, 2012.
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114 days in a Chinese prison.
July 20: According to the AFP: “North Korea said it had no choice but to ‘completely review’ the 
nuclear issue after accusing the US and South Korea over a plot to blow up a statue of its founding 
leader. It did not elaborate on what was meant by a review, but it will add to concerns Pyongyang may 
be planning to conduct a third nuclear test.”
According to KCNA, cited in the AFP release, “Jon Yong-chol said he twice visited China’s northeast-
ern city of Yanji—in March and May this year—where South Korean agents taught him how to use an 
explosive device that could be set off by mobile phone.”11
 The above list contains a number of potential friction points for China and North Korea, but if only two points 
can be chosen for “cause-effect” treatment, we would point to the July 13 visit of PRC Minister of Public Security 
Meng Jianzhu went to the ROK.  As Haggard explained on August 2:
[Kim Young-hwan’s] release followed a visit by PRC Minister of Public Security Meng Jian-
]KXWR6HRXOWKH¿UVWVXFKYLVLWE\D&KLQHVHKHDGRISXEOLFVHFXULW\VLQFHWKHQRUPDOL]DWLRQ
of relations. Press coverage suggests that Meng met with Foreign Minister Kim Sung Hwan, 
Minister of Justice Kwan Jae Jin and National Intelligence Service Director Won Se Hun; 
ZHZRXOGKDYHORYHGWREHDÀ\RQWKHZDOOLQWKRVHGLVFXVVLRQV
7KH.LP<RXQJKZDQFDVHWKXVDSSHDUVWRKDYHSURYLGHGWKHSUHWH[WIRUWKH¿UVWPHHWLQJVEHWZHHQ&KLQHVH3XE-
lic Security leaders and South Korean intelligence counterparts.
The reason this would infuriate DPRK would be obvious. 
The question is then: how does this press conference indicate the type of anger or issues North Korea is ex-
SUHVVLQJFRQFHUQRYHUZLWKUHJDUGWRGHIHFWRUVPRUHEURDGO\DQGERUGHUVHFXULW\PRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\"3HUKDSVD
re-reading of this document and its new annotations will provide some answers.
11  “N. Korea to ‘completely review’ nuclear issue,” AFP, July 20, 2012.
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Beware the North Korean Rumor Mill
by Christopher Green
It is no secret that analysts and experts of all ideological hues tend to be suspicious of stories appearing in the 
PHGLDDERXW1RUWK.RUHD,WLVDWHQGHQF\WKDWLVQRWZLWKRXWMXVWL¿FDWLRQVLQFHSXEOLVKHGVWRULHVIURPWKHJHQUH
have a long and somewhat undistinguished history of being incorrect. Of course, the very act of being wrong is 
DOVRWRVRPHH[WHQWMXVWL¿HGJLYHQWKH1RUWK.RUHDQPHGLDUHDOLW\
Sometimes, problems stem from the desire to attain a certain goal (laudable, in many cases), such as stories 
about starvation presumably aimed at inspiring the delivery of apolitical food aid to the indisputably hungry 
(though not starving) North Korean people.1 On other occasions, they come from an inaccurate interpretation of 
a piece of information received from North Korea that ends with the description of a distorted reality.2 On still 
further occasions, they emerge from the keen commercial desire of sections of the (South Korean, in particular) 
media to maintain the illusion of being.3
+RZHYHUZKDWLVQRWQRWHGZLWKDQ\WKLQJDSSURDFKLQJVXI¿FLHQWIUHTXHQF\LVWKHIDFWWKDWWKH1RUWK.RUHDQ
regime is also extremely adept at disinformation. And yet, disinformation from the horse’s mouth is, this author 
believes, more problematic and potentially disruptive than any other kind.
The following is a story that appeared on the Radio Free Asia (RFA) website on July 3, 2012. RFA has some 
great content, but its translations are slow to arrive when they arrive at all, so I have prepared an English version 
[minus one redundant paragraph: translation Sino-NK]:
There is a rumor going around that Kim Jong-un is in favor of the reform and opening of 
the North Korean economy but is being stopped from so-doing by Jang Sung-taek and Kim 
Kyung-hee. This news is causing the North Korean people’s dislike of the couple [Jang and 
Kim are a married couple] to go through the roof.
1  See “North Korea Today No. 122: Famine special,” Good Friends-NK Today: Research Institute For North Korean Society, April 
2008.
2  Christopher Green, “5.4% Interest from the Central Bank?,” Destination Pyongyang, March 4, 2011.
3  “N. Korean Army Chief ‘Refused to Go Quietly,’” Chosun Ilbo, July 20, 2012.
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Reporter Moon Sung-hwee is here with the story.
Moon: Criticism of Kim Jong-un’s aunt Kim Kyung-hee and her husband Jang is spreading 
in the markets and in universities, and popular dislike of the two is growing rapidly as a 
result. This is supposedly because they are implacably opposed to Kim Jong-un’s plans to 
reform and open the North Korean economy.
$VWXGHQWIURP1RUWK+DPJ\HRQJ3URYLQFHZKRP,UHFHQWO\VSRNHWRH[SODLQHG³.LP-RQJ
un’s reform and opening plan is not being allowed to reach fruition because of the im-
placable opposition of Kim Kyung-hee and Jang Sung-taek. This story is whizzing around 
universities in Pyongyang and the provinces, of course, and also in the markets, and some 
people are really angry.”
According to the student, Kim planned to make the complete reform of farming and the mili-
WDU\KLV¿UVWMREIROORZLQJWKHGHDWKRI.LP-RQJLODQGKDGPDGHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQSODQV
The report then goes on to discuss the ways in which Kim hoped (and may still hope) to carry out military and 
Do disparate data points make a story? | Source: S.Paul Forrest
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agricultural reform. This includes military modernization (including troop number and military service length 
reductions). Notably, he also apparently strongly believes in the need to follow the Chinese road in agriculture so 
as to solve food insecurity issues.
However, when she heard about Kim’s ideas, Kim Kyung-hee reportedly demanded of him, 
³:RXOG\RXLQWKHIRXUWKJHQHUDWLRQGLVFDUGWKHµMXFKHDJULFXOWXUDOODZ¶DQGµPLOLWDU\¿UVW
political line’ made by my father Premier Kim Il-sung and adhered to by my brother NDC 
Chairman Kim Jong-il?”
“You will not abandon socialism for as long as I live,” she apparently went on to declare, 
and husband Jang declared that rapid reform could lead to regime collapse.
As with all quotes in all articles in all Korean print and online media all the time, the precise accuracy of this quote 
has to be regarded with circumspection.
However, a Party cadre source in Yangkang Province, while agreeing that the story is indeed 
going around, added, “For one thing, we don’t know if that is a true story, and even if it is a 
true story we cannot say for sure when it took place. And, even if it did happen, doubts still 
H[LVWRYHUWKHZD\LWOHDNHGRXW´
1HYHUWKHOHVV³7KHXQFRQ¿UPHGUXPRULVFLUFXODWLQJDQGWKHSHRSOH¶VIHHOLQJVWRZDUGV.LP
Kyung-hee and Jang Sung-taek are worsening greatly,” the cadre source continued. “Peo-
ple who know well how people’s minds work may very well have leaked the rumor in order 
to try and restrain Jang Sung-taek.”
It is clear from the outset that this article is no guide whatsoever to government policy, or that it is meant to be. It is 
premised on a (almost certainly) baseless rumor going around in the markets of Yangkang Province, from whence 
its author hails, and it only cites one source. The author, Moon Sung-hwee, makes little secret of these facts.
The problem is that readers outside North Korea are not always aware of from where or by what means such 
stories often emerge.
THE FRAGMENTED ARCHITECTURE OF NORTH KOREAN NEWS | It is important to note that what we (with 
“we” meaning any group trying to get news out of North Korea) are working with is, in truth, a pretty fragile piece 
of newsgathering architecture. In the classic format, the words of a source are received by phone or text message, 
and those words are then both tested for credibility by people with knowledge of how North Korea tends to oper-
ate and cross-checked with other sources from the same region or, in the case of big stories, areas nationwide.
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While much of the information that emerges in this way comes from relatively well-connected sources such 
as Korean Workers’ Party cadres of good standing who want the truth to be heard or from Chinese-Korean traders 
who are privy to more information than most people due to their relative ease of movement, much of the rest is 
derived from conversations held in local markets or received from sources with less pure motives (or both). A lot 
will also be hearsay received at three, four or ten times removed.
This state of affairs is extremely open to North Korean abuse. North Korea is known to actively operate on 
the premise that a well-timed declaration in the market in Hyesan, Sinuiju or Namyang can arrive on the pages 
of Chosun Ilbo or, as in this case, Radio Free Asia in a heartbeat. From there, of course, rumor gains its own cur-
rency, and eventually becomes fact. Before you know it, it is a feature article in the New York Times and informing 
government policy inside the Beltway.
The aim of such disinformation is not just to misinform the international community, either. In a country like 
1RUWK.RUHDZKHUHODWHUDODQGGRZQZDUGÀRZVRILQIRUPDWLRQDUHGHOLEHUDWHO\LPSHGHGDVDPDWWHURIVWDWHSRO-
icy, methods of affecting public opinion outside the limited strictures of the state media are in very short supply.
RUMORS AS FACTIONAL MANEUVERING | What this means is that when one party wishes to constrain the 
actions of another party, whomever each may be, one of the best ways to do so is by word-of-mouth. Ergo, as the 
cadre in the RFA article points out, “People who know well how people’s minds work may very well have leaked 
that rumor in order to try and restrain Jang Sung-taek.” This domestic imperative incentivizes disinformation 
Jang Sung-taek and Kim Jong-un | Source: Daily News America
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ÀRZVDQGPDNHVLWHYHQKDUGHUIRUSHRSOHERWKZLWKLQDQGZLWKRXWWKHFRXQWU\WRZRUNRXWZKDWLVWUXHDQGZKDW
is not.
You may be wondering what the spreading of this particular rumor could have been intended to achieve? Here 
are a few quick ideas:
1) It could have been put out by the government itself, acting with the full knowledge of Kim Jong-un, 
Jang Sung-taek and Kim Kyung-hee, to make sure that the development of Kim Jong-un’s public image 
as a ‘man of the people’ is not damaged by the state’s failure to meet the reformist expectations of the 
public (i.e. “Kim really wanted reform because he loves you people so much, but those assholes Jang 
and Kim stopped him doing it”); or
 2) It could have been released by someone from within the Cabinet, which is meant to control the civil-
ian economy but does not completely do so, in order to raise public expectations of reform and force 
the government and military in that direction, a move which can then be attributed to Kim Jong-un’s 
determined leadership later on (i.e. “That couple Jang and Kim wanted to stop the leader reforming the 
nation out of his boundless love for the people, but he would not be stopped and now he has won!”); or
3) It could have been the government wanting to convince the international community that there is a 
dispute in the North Korean elite between reformers and conservatives in the hope that this will lead 
governments in Seoul, Washington, Tokyo, Moscow, and Beijing to lend a supporting hand to the gov-
ernment on the premise that giving aid and development assistance on a massive scale will help to but-
WUHVVWKHLQÀXHQFHRIWKHUHIRUPLVWZLQJLH³/HW¶VFRQVSLUHWRFRQYLQFHRXUGXPEDVVQHLJKERUVWKDW
WKHUHLVD¿JKWIRULQÀXHQFHLQ3\RQJ\DQJDQGWKDWRQO\E\WKHLUJLYLQJDLGIRUWKHVDNHRIWKRVHRIXV
who want to open the country will they be able to help us face down the conservatives. Everybody in?”)
GUNPLAY IN PYONGYANG?  |  To reiterate, this is not just something that happens with market rumors, either. 
One would be wise to take with a pinch of salt even those stories that emerge from government sources, too. Take 
DORRNDWWKHUHFHQWWDOHRIDJXQ¿JKWGXULQJWKHVDFNLQJRI90DU/HH<RXQJKRIURPKLV3DUW\SRVWVODVW-XO\
The “facts” as reported by Chosun Ilbo are that, following the ruling clique (taken to mean Kim Jong-un, 
Jang Sung-taek, Kim Kyung-hee and, to a lesser extent, Choi Ryong-hae)’s decision to remove Lee, V. Mar Choi 
5\RQJKDHZDVVHQWWRGHOLYHUWKHEDGQHZV+LVDWWHPSWVWRIROORZWKURXJKRQWKLVLQVSLUHGD¿UH¿JKWZLWK/HH
loyalists during which as many as 20 people were killed.4
While I cannot discount the possibility that this story is true, there are a great many reasons to suspect that it is, 
4  Ibid.
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in fact, not. First, my own subsequent inquiries have not turned up a single western source in Pyongyang who so 
PXFKDVKHDUG¿UVWRUVHFRQGKDQGDERXWWKH¿UH¿JKWXQWLOWROGWKDWLWKDGPDGHWKHIURQWSDJHRIWKHChosun Ilbo.
6HFRQGWKH¿QDOVHQWHQFHRIWKHSLHFHWHOOVPHWKDWHYHQWKHChosun Ilbo itself was keen to hedge against the 
VWRU\WXUQLQJRXWWREHMXQN$Q\WLPHDSLHFHRQ1RUWK.RUHDFRQFOXGHVZLWKDSDUDJUDSKOLNHµ´7KH¿UH¿JKW
KDVVWLOOQRWEHHQSHUFHQWFRQ¿UPHG¶VDLGDJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOKHUHµ,WPD\WDNHVRPHWLPHIRUXVWRJDLQD
clearer picture of what happened.’” it is usually wise to be suspicious.
So, if this is not true either, where did it come from and why was it released? Well, assuming that it was based 
on genuine information obtained from a genuine source in Pyongyang to begin with, rather than 1) simply being 
made up by a Chosun Ilbo reporter to maintain that particular newspaper’s reputation; or 2) based on informa-
tion made up and disseminated by the South Korean intelligence services for the purpose of promoting the Lee 
Myung-bak administration’s own inter-Korean agenda, the question is why the North Korean government would 
ZDQWWKHRXWVLGHZRUOGWREHOLHYHWKDWD¿UH¿JKWKDGRFFXUUHG
In short, it was clearly intended to intimate the presence of a very serious schism in the regime. Therefore, the 
goal is the same as objective 3) for the RFA story.
One need not be in possession of exceptional strategic genius to have worked out that following his shock 
removal, V. Mar Lee would be described in South Korea and elsewhere as a hardliner and core proponent of the 
PLOLWDU\¿UVWSROLF\DQGWKXVWKDWLWZRXOGEHDVVXPHGWKDWKLVUHPRYDOUHSUHVHQWHGDQDWWHPSWWRIRUFHFKDQJH
against the wishes of the military elite (remember, everyone already knows that V. Mar Choi Ryong-hae is a “ci-
vilian” (misguidedly assumed to mean liberal) in a military uniform).
Equally, such information implies that Kim is working hard to take full control of the military, but also insinu-
ates that this is not an easy task and that he needs regional circumstances to remain placid in order to allow him to 
play his Party-centered hand against the weight of a People’s Army built up over the course of 17 long, military-
¿UVW\HDUV(UJR³%HQLFHWRPH,¶PWU\LQJWRFKDQJH2KDQGSHUKDSV\RXPLJKWFRQVLGHUDSROLF\UHYLHZ"´
I do not claim to know in the case of either story what is right or wrong, or even to present a comprehensive list 
of possible North Korean aims. I’m not even prepared to rule out the possibility that both stories are true (although 
they do contradict each other in their judgment of the nature of Jang Sung-taek and Kim Kyung-hee, making this 
RXWFRPHKLJKO\XQOLNHO\1RUDP,KHUHWRSRLQWWKH¿QJHURIGRXEWDW0RRQ6XQJKZHHZKRLVDIULHQGDQG
someone I respect, or at the Chosun Ilbo, which I believe mostly does its best to provide “news” on a country to 
which it cannot ordinarily gain access.
No: my only point is to say once again that the “North Korea newsgathering structure” is, by necessity, de-
signed in such a way that it is open to exploitation. This is done by outsiders, sure, but the North Korean govern-
PHQWDQGLWVDI¿OLDWHVGRLWERWKPRUHDQGLQPRUHZD\VWKDQDQ\RWKHUJURXS'RQRWEHJLQWRLPDJLQHWKH\DUH
not trying to use their information superiority to their advantage. Read and analyze with great care. 
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